[lincon127]

I don't think it quite the arbitrary distinction you're making it out to be. If you were cloned every time you went to sleep, and those clones awoke with the same memories you had before going to bed. Would you consider all of those clones' consciousnesses to be part of your own? Surely not, because you're not experiencing them, you're only experiencing your own. This means that the "you", in this case, is the self reflective portion of the collection of interpretations of sensory stimulus and memories, whereas consciousness is that collection as a whole. That's why these clones can't possibly be "you", because if there's no sensory stimulus being experienced or interpreted by your brain, then there is no consciousness and there certainly is no "you". What this ends up meaning is that "you" are necessarily bound to the mechanical component that interprets stimuli. That component can be adjusted over time, but the process must be interpreted in such a way that it seems gradual enough that your brain can still recognize those intermediary interpretations as "you".

So, when you state that robo brain is still "you", I have to disagree. While robo-brain can still believe it's "you", it can't possibly be "you", as "you" could potentially still exist in the original biomechanical device, which isn't interpreting the new body's stimuli, and thus not building a sensory profile based on the stimulus. Even if there was a transfer that resulted in the original device's (i.e. your body) death, the new body still couldn't be considered "you" as there isn't anything physically different about the two scenarios for the body.

Of course, if you consider every clone to be an extension of your consciousness, then you could argue all this. But at that point I think we'd have vastly different interpretations on what consciousness and "you" are. You could also argue that there is something physically different about the two scenarios presented in the robo-brain example, but the only way I can imagine a sincere argument for that is if you told me it was due to the transference of some soul-like entity. But, of course, if you were to tell me that, I would simply disagree.