[ekimekim]

> I disagree that strategic voting as a downside outweighs the downsides of RCV or FPTP - especially when FPTP itself is susceptible to strategic voting, too.

To clarify, I never intended that as a defence of FPTP. It's awful and I'll take any of the systems being discussed here over it. It was a statement specifically towards IRV over score/approval.

[ClayShentrup]

there is no good argument for IRV over score/approval. score and approval blow IRV out of the water on literally every single metric that matters. they're simpler, more accurate (with any ratio of strategic or honest voters), and more transparent and fair to minor party candidates.

https://clayshentrup.medium.com/later-no-harm-72c44e145510

it's not even close.

[dragonwriter]

> there is no good argument for IRV over score/approval

Score voting calls for ambiguous, proven-to-be-culturally-variable ratings that have no natural relationship to preferences (and approval does the same thing in an opposite way, while score voting relies on ambiguous distinctions that don’t have a clear mapping from actual preferences, approval forces voters to rank with artificial ties that don’t have a clear mapping to actual preferences); most metrics simply do not reflect this because they have no mechanism to.

Where these problems don’t apply, as is the case many places outside of secret ballots for elections of public officers, score and approval can be great. E.g., open ballot approval on a choice of a group activity where voting “approve” is a commitment to participate if the selected option wins makes perfect sense, or open-ballot score voting where the given score is a commitment to provide some quantity of resources proportional to the score to the common effort if the item given that score wins. Then the ratings given are tied to concrete differences in preferences.

(On the other hand, choosing between single-winner ballot methods is mostly a waste of time regardless of the abstract merits of the particular system; the most significant difference within democratic systems in quality of government by popular engagement, popular satisfaction with government, and a number of other measures is with the degree of proportionality of the main legislative body, and no single-winner system is going to deliver much of an improvement there, you need a system designed for proportionality, which means multimember districts on some level.)