[xgstation]

the fact that `pip install` just runs whatever is in `setup.py` is still mind baffling, even if the author weren't mallicious the `setup.py` can still do harm (say delete a file by mistake), there really needs to be an official way of sandbox its running.

[ogrisel]

Note that it's possible to disable that behavior with `pip install --only-binary :all:`.

This way, pip will fail if a dependency does not provide a `.whl` package, instead of automatically falling back to the "build from source" mode that can lead to arbitrary code execution at install time (via setuptools' `setup.py` or any other build backend mechanism).

However, installing from wheels just protects from arbitrary code execution at install time. If you do not trust the source and integrity of the package you install, you would still be subject to arbitrary code execution at import time.

Therefore, tools and processes to improve package provenance tracing and integrity checking are useful for both kinds of installations.

[xgstation]

I think sometimes the problem is coming from accidental typos instead of not trusting, say if one accidentally typed `pip install requests` into `pip install requestss` and if `requestss` is malacious then by the time one noticed the typo the setup.py could have already run to do the harm

[woodruffw]

It's not good, but it should also not be baffling: it's the exact same thing other ecosystems do (npm with install hooks/scripts, Rust with build.rs, Ruby with gemspecs, etc).

[xgstation]

I know other ecosystems do the same and those are baffling too, especially for the newer created languages like rust, which is why https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/pre-rfc-sandboxed-determin... exists

[f1shy]

Notably also common lisp (quicklisp)

[pjc50]

I don't think that makes much of a difference from the risk of bugs in the rest of the package when it's run.