[hashseed]

Hi. I'm the V8 engineer who implemented the fix and wrote the blog post.

The reason the initial bug report [0] was marked as WAI but the Medium blog post got a lot more traction is very simple and much more human.

When the initial issue was filed to the chromium bug tracker, it was routed to Chrome's security team. From a security perspective, Math.random() provides no guarantees about cryptographic safety, so naturally it was marked as WAI – nobody from the V8 team actually saw this issue. One of the suggestions "3. Make crypto.random(size)" was acted upon though, and so crypto.getRandomValues() was introduced in Chrome 11, about 10 months after the issue report. In terms of specifying and introducing new Web APIs, this was incredibly fast.

After the Medium blog post was published, someone filed an issue directly to the V8 project. It did not question the spec compliance, but pointed out that the PRNG quality could be better. That nerd-sniped me into researching this topic and after reading a few papers, I implemented the fix with xorshift128+. I'm thankful that my team lead allowed me to set aside some time to work on this even though it was not on our project roadmap.

Performance regressions that could affect our benchmark performance was of course part of the consideration, but there were many options to avoid a performance regression. In V8, crossing the boundary between machine code compiled from JS to C++ runtime builtins is fairly expensive. I could have either ported xorshift128+ to assembly so that this boundary crossing was not necessary, or I could have amortized the boundary crossing cost by buffering multiple random values. I chose the latter because porting to assembly is error prone and I would have to do this for each platform. There are better options in V8 nowadays, by expressing the algorithm in an intermediate representation, but back then that was not available.

[0] https://g-issues.chromium.org/issues/40404440 [1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getR... [2] https://g-issues.chromium.org/issues/40643979