[alwayslikethis]

But isn't the key just in the url? If the key is sent to the servers in any way, it can be used to decrypt and read the files. I'm not sure that this achieves anything more than a pinky promise of "we won't read your files" because when push comes to shove the keys will be logged and turned over to the authorities.

[voxic11]

I haven't used the product but if the key is in the fragment segment of the URL then its not sent to the server. This is a pretty common pattern for these e2e encrypted web apps.

> The fragment of a URI is the last part of the URI, starting with the # character. It is used to identify a specific part of the resource, such as a section of a document or a position in a video. The fragment is not sent to the server when the URI is requested, but it is processed by the client (such as the browser) after the resource is retrieved.

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/URI/Reference/F...

[xnx]

Couldn't on-page javascript read the fragment and send that to an endpoint?

[alwayslikethis]

It doesn't seem to be.

[pcthrowaway]

Cryptpad (the non-enterprise version anyway) puts the encryption key for its document links after the fragment ('#') which means that doesn't get sent to the servers.

However, anyone using a browser like Chrome, Safari, or Edge that has cloud syncing will be sending this URL to the respective browser manufacturers, which means you're still handing over the documents to Google (or Apple, or Microsoft)

[voxic11]

Safari and Chrome (and Firefox!) cloud syncing are e2e encrypted so you should not be handing over anything to Apple or Google. I haven't looked into Edge/Microsofts solution but I would hope they would e2e encrypt as well.

Edit: Actually just looked and I can't find any information indicating Edge sync is e2e encrypted except for enterprise accounts. So beware of that browser if you weren't already.

[tantalor]

It's trivial for the host to inject some JavaScript that reads the fragment and phones home.

The FISA request writes itself.