[betimsl]

Apple’s encryption, is designed with end-to-end encryption for many types of data.

Some facts:

    Only the user's devices hold the keys to decrypt the data.

    Apple cannot decrypt it, even if served a subpoena.

Apple chose privacy over convenience. Sue all you want, you're going to lose.

[lxgr]

Then delete that data and let the user start over. How come Apple gets to hold iTunes purchases (apps, movies etc.) and somebody's email address hostage just because they also happen to store some end-to-end encrypted data on the same cloud account?

Just imagine Google letting people "brick" their accounts because they have a password protected PDF in their Google Drive they don't remember the password for...

And that's to say nothing about the not end-to-end encrypted data, which is still the default for most things in iCloud accounts (without ADP enabled).

[lelandbatey]

Read the article, that's not true by default, the only way you get that level of cryptographic protection is if you enable "Advanced Data Protection". None of the people in the article did that, all of them can trivially prove they are who they say they are via government documents, Apple could decrypt their data and return it, but Apple is refusing to do so.

[betimsl]

It's simply not Apple's responsibility. Person's data, their responsibility. Any other way and people lose trust in Apple which BTW they protect it by any means. Trust.

Instead of wanting something impossible, accept the reality.