[Bearstrike]

This comment is correct as written: The U.S. is under-equipped with small UAS.

However, if you're suggesting that that the U.S. is blind to the importance of small UAS (given the context of the article), that is fortunately not the case.

The U.S. started taking note of the importance of small UAS as early as the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, where their use was prevalent. The continued appearance of small UAS (and their increased volume) throughout the war in Ukraine cemented the place of small UAS in future combat.

The recognition of how small UAS are changing the game is a big reason (but not the only reason) the Army cancelled the FARA program. Manned Aviation at the scale it is done in the past is not how wars will be won. It isn't going away, but it's roles/prevalance is changing.

If you're truly interested, see the DoD memos this week that include info about the Army's shift in focus with respect to aviation and unmanned systems.

[cameldrv]

They may recognize that it's an issue, but the problem is going to be procurement and manufacturing. Ukraine is building FPV drones for about $500 each. A Switchblade 300, which is roughly comparable to these, costs $60,000.

At those prices, we will never have the kind of quantities that Ukraine and Russia have.

[int_19h]

It was $500 per unit when they started building them in the first year of the war. It's closer to $400 per unit now, AFAIK, because they have learned where to cut corners without affecting efficiency.

[pmontra]

It's probably "Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform" https://www.defense.gov/news/publications/

I wonder if UAS include small FPV drones. The language of those announcements is necessarily vague.

[parrit]

Action is more important than intent. I'm sure many at Kodak knew that digital was a threat too. Organisational resistance prevents knowledge turning into action.