[dabedee]

You raise a valid point about ex ante uncertainty. We can't know future outcomes with certainty, and yes, Figma theoretically could have failed. But antitrust analysis isn't about predicting exact valuations. It's about market structure and competitive dynamics. The FTC had observable facts: Adobe's dominant market share, Figma's rapid growth trajectory, and a purchase price of 50x revenue (extraordinary even for software). These factors suggested Adobe saw Figma as a competitive threat worth eliminating, not just a financial investment. That's the key distinction from your dice game; this wasn't pure randomness but observable market dynamics. You're right that we can't prove the counterfactual. But antitrust law doesn't require certainty, just reasonable probability of competitive harm. The extreme premium Adobe offered was itself evidence they valued removing competition more than acquiring assets. The outcome validates the analysis, but even if Figma had struggled, preserving the possibility of competition has value beyond any single company's success.

[terminalshort]

But now you are contradicting your initial argument. Here you say that the price offered by Adobe was astronomically high, and therefore an indicator that the offer was not legitimate, but initially you said that the FTC made the right decision because the offer was 3x lower than the IPO price.

[lukeschlather]

No, the argument is that Adobe willing to pay a high price is a good signal that Figma was not a dice roll but actually worth much more than Adobe was willing to pay.

[aetherson]

Obviously the die game is a simplified stylized example. Yes, I agree, that chance that Figma stock was worth literally zero (above what was paid) was less than 50%. But the point is that there was obviously risk that Figma would be worth less than $20B, otherwise Figma wouldn't have wanted to take the deal.