[MagicalTux]

Seems fairly similar, ARM's response to TEE basically. We started with SGX because it is battle tested and has a lot of people still trying to find issues, meaning any issue is likely solved quickly, however we are planning to also evaluate and support other solutions. Information is restricted and cannot leave the enclave unless the code running in there allows it to in both cases.

[tossaway23523]

> battle tested

lol

SGX has been broken time and again

SGX has 0-day exploits live in the wild as we speak

so... valiant attempt in terms of your product... but utterly unsuitable foundation

[MagicalTux]

As far as I know SGX has no 0-day exploits live today. sgx.fail was the largest collection of attacks and have all been resolved.

What this tells me however is there are a lot of people trying to attack SGX still today, and Intel has improved their response a lot.

The main issue with SGX was that its initial designed use for client-side DRM was flawed by the fact you can't expect normal people to update their BIOS (meaning downloading update, putting it on a storage device, rebooting, going into BIOS, updating, etc) each time an update is pushed (and adoption wasn't good enough for that), it is however having a lot of use server-side for finance, auto industry and others.

We are also planning to support other TEE in the future, SGX is the most well known and battle tested today, with a lot of support by software like openenclave, making it a good initial target.

If you do know of any 0-day exploit currently live on SGX, please give me more details, and if it's something not yet published please contact us directly at [e-mail]

[A1kmm]

And once a CPU is attacked with a voltage glitching type attack, the compromise is so complete that the secret seeds burned into the hardware are leaked.

Once they are leaked, there is no going back for that secret seed - i.e. that physical CPU. And this attack is entirely offline, so Intel doesn't know which CPUs have had their seeds leaked.

In other words, every time there is a vulnerability like this, no CPU affected can ever be trusted again for attestation purposes. That is rather impractical - so I'd consider even if you trust Intel (unlikely if you consider a government that can coerce Intel to be part of your threat model), SGX provides rather a weak guarantee against well-resourced adversaries (such as the US government).