[mhast]

As someone who used to work for a bank building applications I would say no. This is definitely a feature companies and organizations like banks would request if it wasn't available.

There are a lot of scams targeting vulnerable people and these days attacking the phone is a very "easy" way of doing this.

Now perhaps there is a more forgiving way of implementing it though. So your phone can switch between trusted and "open" mode. But realistically I don't think the demand is big enough for that to actually matter.

[const_cast]

Play integrity does almost nothing to prevent malicious actors. In fact, id say overall it's probably more harmful because it gives actors like Banks false confidence.

Even with play integrity, you should not trust the client. Devices can still be compromised, there are still phony bank apps, there are still keyloggers, etc.

With the Web, things like banks are sort of forced to design apps that do not rely on client trust. With something like play integrity, they might not be. That's a big problem.

[mike_hearn]

I've worked on such systems. Love it or hate it, remote attestation slaughters abuse. It is just much harder to scale up fraud schemes to profitable levels if you can't easily automate anything. That's why it exists and why banks use it.

[brookst]

That’s a “seatbelts so no good because people still die in car crashes” argument with a topping of “actually they’re bad because they give you a false sense of security”

Play integrity hugely reduces brute force and compromised device attacks. Yes, it does not eliminate either, but security is a game of statistics because there is rarely a verifiably perfect solution in complex systems.

For most large public apps, the vast majority of signin attempts are malicious. And the vast majority of successful attacks come from non-attested platforms like desktop web. Attestation is a valuable tool here.

[cyphar]

Unfortunately, this kind of thinking leads to insane situations such as the South Korean banking cartel which requires users to install several pieces of "security software"[1] which make your computer more vulnerable to security issues[2] and almost certainly doesn't protect anyone from actual fraud -- classic security theatre.

There needs to be a point where enough is enough, and locking down devices so that you cannot install programs nor practically use custom operating systems on them anymore is way past that line.

[1]: https://palant.info/2023/01/02/south-koreas-online-security-... [2]: https://ee.kaist.ac.kr/en/research-achieve/in-south-korea-ma...

[cyphar]

> There needs to be a point where enough is enough, and locking down devices so that you cannot install programs nor practically use custom operating systems on them anymore is way past that line.

That is to say, banks are not the only entities in existence.

If they really need such high security to avoid scams and losing such large sums of money they should just issue bank customers with a locked down device that can only be used for banking (maybe banks can collaborate on a standard for it so you can have one device for multiple banks). To be clear, I would still probably be strongly against such a proposal but at least we would be talking about a somewhat understandable approach.

[IshKebab]

> This is definitely a feature companies and organizations like banks would request if it wasn't available.

Really? Because they've been fine without this feature on desktop for literally decades.