Show HN: Paasword – a password vault that never stores your passwords

[yoyo250]

Warning: pre-release, unaudited, not for production use. (Though my password was generated with it)

Instead of saving secrets, it derives them on demand using domain + username + a short passphrase + a physical OpenPGP key (smartcard/YubiKey).

Passwords are reproducible but never persisted.

Currently tested only with RSA4096 on Windows + GnuPG 2.4.x.

[zahlman]

> a physical OpenPGP key (smartcard/YubiKey)

I don't know how you get a reproducible value from this, but in the use described it isn't actually contributing a second factor.

[yoyo250]

You're right — it's not a true "second factor" in the 2FA sense.

The idea is to bind password derivation to a physical OpenPGP key.

Without the smartcard/YubiKey inserted, the program can't generate the same password, even if someone knows the domain/username/phrase.

So the key isn't used as extra entropy, but as an essential part of the derivation process.