Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages Compromised

[JonChesterfield]

AI detected potential malware. Plus a bunch of words. Is this a real thing? It does look like all the other npm compromise notes. But the page has AI and potential written on it, so the whole thing may be fabricated, and there are no other comments here.

So on balance I guess I'll ignore it. What a time to be a developer.

[feross]

Founder of socket.dev here. “AI detected potential malware” is what we call the alerts generated by our automated malware detection engine that runs on all newly published open source packages in real-time. However, these alerts are reviewed by our threat research team and once a human has confirmed the finding, we upgrade it to “Known malware”.

At this point (given we just published research about this) we've upgraded this threat to Known malware.

So in short:

- “AI detected potential malware” = automated system found something suspicious

- “Known malware” = human confirmed it’s real

The wording is intentional because not every automated hit ends up being true malware. It’s better to give developers early visibility into possible threats, even if they turn out to be benign, than to miss a real attack.

[seanieb]

socket.dev is a well known a reputable company, and their founder is pretty well known and trusted too. And looking that their blog post it looks like detected a real attack.

[ATechGuy]

Speculating based on another post: "...our investors are pushing us hard to frame it as AI..."

[kevin_thibedeau]

To avoid LeftPad 3.0 they're going to have to add some sort of signed capabilities manifest to restrict API access for these narrow domain packages. Then attackers would limited to targeting those with network privileges.

[lrvick]

Package signing of any kind was ruled out in 2013 for nonsensical reasons https://github.com/npm/npm/pull/4016

[jimmyl02]

this being the 2nd large compromise of the week is not boding well from the NPM ecosystem...

supply chain is and has been the new gold mine for bad actors it seems

[seanieb]

There have been practical suggestions that could prevent this but NPM has not yet adopted:

- Prevent publishing new package versions for 24–48 hours after account credentials are changed.

- Require support for security keys.

[lelanthran]

>

NPM has bigger problems - no adults in the room! For example, they've been rejecting signed packages since 2014 or thereabouts?

Expect npm repos to be overflowing with AI-submitted crap that will lower the signal substantially due to not having any sort of identify via signing.

[efortis]

Mitigate it with:

  echo "ignore-scripts=true" >> ~/.npmrc

https://blog.uxtly.com/getting-rid-of-npm-scripts

[lrvick]

And then the vulnerable code will just move to shell execs in the main library that fire the next time you include the library in your project.

If you do not have time to review a library, then do not use it.

[wrs]

Some packages have install scripts that actually need to run (e.g., esbuild).

pnpm refuses to run install scripts from packages you haven’t manually authorized, which helps a bit.

[aussieguy1234]

They're scanning for credentials. If they can get things like AWS credentials, I would expect to see cloud crypto mining as their next move. So it would be a good idea to keep an eye on your infra if you are affected.

[lrvick]

Anyone that has production AWS creds in the same operating system they randomly execute unreviewed code on the internet on should have their access revoked.

[alex_suzuki]

Nice little Dune reference in there: The malware installs a Github action if it finds an access token, and names it 'shai-hulud-workflow.yml'. Shai Hulud is the Fremen term for the sandworms on Arrakis.

[danieldspx]

I if you think that last week attack was s1ngularity that can be related to wormhole, now we get this shai-hulud that is actually a worm. Funny right? They are similar attacks also. This funny coincidence was described by someone at Aikido Security.