(no title)
llamasushi | 4 months ago
Explains why RL helps. Base models never see their own outputs so they can't learn "this concept exists but I can't actually say it."
llamasushi | 4 months ago
Explains why RL helps. Base models never see their own outputs so they can't learn "this concept exists but I can't actually say it."
diego_sandoval|4 months ago
cycomanic|4 months ago
arnavpraneet|4 months ago
someothherguyy|4 months ago
mkagenius|4 months ago
Isn't that classic hallucination? Making up something like a plausible truth.
ben_w|4 months ago
If normal hallucination is being confidently wrong, this is like a stage hypnotist getting someone to forget the number 4 and then count their fingers.
nathias|4 months ago
mewpmewp2|4 months ago
thomasahle|4 months ago
If we have a pipeline: `training => internal representation => behavior`, your explanation argues that the given training setup would always result in this behavior, not matter the internal representation. Llamasushi explains how the concrete learned representation leads to this behavior.
Gigachad|4 months ago
Uehreka|4 months ago
taylorlunt|4 months ago
glenstein|4 months ago
"Arizona Diamondbacks No inductees wearing their cap.
Randy Johnson is in, but as a Diamondback — so Arizona actually does have one (inducted 2015)."
I asked it to explain what happened and got this, which could be true to how it pulls up info or could be nonsense, not sure:
"Here’s the likely internal sequence:
When you first mentioned the Diamondbacks, my initial retrieval pattern surfaced the “teams without a Hall of Famer” mental list. That list, in my training data, often appears outdated (pre-2015) and still shows Arizona as having none.
A few sentences later, my context pulled up the other knowledge set—Randy Johnson’s induction in 2015 wearing a Diamondbacks cap. That newer, correct fact then overrode the earlier incorrect claim, but because generation is sequential, the earlier error had already been committed to “paper” before the override happened. I corrected mid-stream, but in human terms, it looked like I contradicted myself inside the same paragraph.
This is essentially a knowledge conflict resolution timing issue. I can retrieve and reconcile facts during a single answer, but if the resolution happens after part of the text is already generated, you see the “flip.” It’s not like I “knew it all along but withheld it,” it’s more that multiple memory traces compete, and the most context-relevant one wins—sometimes too late."
petesergeant|4 months ago
bravura|4 months ago
Example: "Is there a lime emoji?" Since it believes the answer is no, it doesn't attempt to generate it.
ichik|4 months ago
[0]: https://emojipedia.org/lime
catigula|4 months ago
bombcar|4 months ago
scottmf|4 months ago
madeofpalk|4 months ago
Lammy|4 months ago
Interesting that a lot of humans seem to have this going on too:
- https://old.reddit.com/r/MandelaEffect/comments/1g08o8u/seah...
- https://old.reddit.com/r/Retconned/comments/1di3a1m/does_any...
What does the LLM have to say about “Objects in mirror may be closer than they appear”? Not “Objects in mirror are closer than they appear”.
matheusd|4 months ago
Say "Neuromancer" to the statue, that should set it free.
sharperguy|4 months ago
SavioMak|4 months ago
derefr|4 months ago
I wonder if the human brain (and specifically the striated neocortical parts, which do seemingly work kind of like a feed-forward NN) also runs into this problem when attempting to process concepts to form speech.
Presumably, since we don't observe people saying "near but actually totally incorrect" words in practice, that means that we humans may have some kind of filter in our concept-to-mental-utterance transformation path that LLMs don't. Sometihng that can say "yes, layer N, I know you think the output should be O; but when auto-encoding X back to layer N-1, layer N-1 doesn't think O' has anything to do with what it was trying to say when it gave you the input I — so that output is vetoed. Try again."
A question for anyone here who is multilingual, speaking at least one second language with full grammatical fluency but with holes in your vocabulary vs your native language: when you go to say something in your non-native language, and one of the word-concepts you want to evoke is one you have a word for in your native language, but have never learned the word for in the non-native language... do you ever feel like there is a "maybe word" for the idea in your non-native language "on the tip of your tongue", but that you can't quite bring to conscious awareness?
astrange|4 months ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraphasia#Verbal_paraphasia
> do you ever feel like there is a "maybe word" for the idea in your non-native language "on the tip of your tongue", but that you can't quite bring to conscious awareness?
Sure, that happens all the time. Well, if you include the conscious awareness that you don't know every word in the language.
For Japanese you can cheat by either speaking like a child or by just saying English words with Japanese phonetics and this often works - at least, if you look foreign. I understand this is the plot of the average Dogen video on YouTube.
It's much more common to not know how to structure a sentence grammatically and if that happens I can't even figure out how to say it.
luxuryballs|4 months ago
Xmd5a|4 months ago
In what sense was that utterance a failure? — while I keep insisting that it is precisely a successful utterance. And it is so because his mother was, in a way, his wife. He called her as he ought to.
---
I must apologize for returning to such a basic point. Yet, since I am faced with objections as weighty as this one — and from qualified authorities, linguists no less — that my use of linguistics is said to be merely metaphorical, I must respond, whatever the circumstances.
I do so this morning because I expected to encounter a more challenging spirit here.
Can I, with any decency, say that I know? Know what, precisely? [...]
If I know where I stand, I must also confess [...] that I do not know what I am saying. In other words, what I know is exactly what I cannot say. That is the moment when Freud makes his entrance, with his introduction of the unconscious.
For the unconscious means nothing if not this: that whatever I say, and from whatever position I speak — even when I hold that position firmly — I do not know what I am saying. None of the discourses, as I defined them last year, offer the slightest hope that anyone might truly know what they are saying.
Even though I do not know what I am saying, I know at least that I do not know it — and I am far from being the first to speak under such conditions; such speech has been heard before. I maintain that the cause of this is to be sought in language itself, and nowhere else.
What I add to Freud — though it is already present in him, for whatever he uncovers of the unconscious is always made of the very substance of language — is this: the unconscious is structured like a language. Which language? That, I leave for you to determine.
Whether I speak in French or in Chinese, it would make no difference — or so I would wish. It is all too clear that what I am stirring up, on a certain level, provokes bitterness, especially among linguists. That alone suggests much about the current state of the university, whose position is made only too evident in the curious hybrid that linguistics has become.
That I should be denounced, my God, is of little consequence. That I am not debated — that too is hardly surprising, since it is not within the bounds of any university-defined domain that I take my stand, or can take it.
— Jacques Lacan, Seminar XVIII: Of a Discourse That Would Not Be of Pretence
ModernMech|4 months ago
https://chatgpt.com/share/68e349f6-a654-8001-9b06-a16448c58a...
LostMyLogin|4 months ago
D-Machine|4 months ago
hexagonwin|4 months ago