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vayup | 4 months ago
- T-Mobile backhaul: Users' SMS, voice call contents and internet traffic content in plain text.
- AT&T Mexico cellular backhaul: Raw user internet traffic
- TelMex VOIP on satellite backhaul: Plaintext voice calls
- U.S. military: SIP traffic exposing ship names
- Mexico government and military: Unencrypted intra-government traffic
- Walmart Mexico: Unencrypted corporate emails, plaintext credentials to inventory management systems, inventory records transferred and updated using FTP
This is insane!
While it is important to work on futuristic threats such as Quantum cryptanalysis, backdoors in standardized cryptographic protocols, etc. - the unfortunate reality is that the vast majority of real-world attacks happen because basic protection is not enabled. Good reminder not take our eyes off the basics.
alfiedotwtf|4 months ago
Not as insane as it was in the early 2000s…
> while link-layer encryption has been standard practice in satellite TV for decades
Before Snowden, I would say 99% of ALL TCP traffic I saw on satellites was in unadulterated plain-text. Web and email mostly.
… the pipe was so fast, you could only pcap if you had a SCSI hard drive!
petercooper|4 months ago
SMS was also a bit like this in its early days and you could read them coming off the local cell (also true of calls at a certain time, but I didn't see much of this).
I just did a quick search and apparently many pagers in the UK are still running cleartext POCSAG! https://www.reddit.com/r/RTLSDR/comments/1asnchu/are_uk_page...
T3OU-736|4 months ago
This is why NSA asked for (and got from SGI) a guranteed rate I/O API - to make sure that whstever the signal intelkigence platform sensors captured could be written to storage.
unknown|4 months ago
[deleted]
feraloink|4 months ago
>we re-scanned with their permission and were able to verify a remedy had been deployed: T-Mobile, WalMart, and KPU.
The fact that critical infrastructure (e.g. utility companies using satellite links for remote-operated SCADA) was exposed is really scary too.
colechristensen|4 months ago
Really serious security risks in critical/industrial infrastructure are ... numerous. And these aren't complex vulnerabilities, these are leaving the door open with default passwords, unencrypted traffic, and that sort of thing.
jabiko|4 months ago
Also a fun fact: For a long time it was only semi-officially known that the BND owned and operated the site. Officially it was called "Long distance telecommunications station of the Bundeswehr" and operated by the "Federal Office for Telecommunications Statistics"
MagnumOpus|4 months ago
Officially it has been transferred to the BND; experience suggests all data from there still goes straight back to Fort Meade… (And in exchange the BND gets some morsels back on people _they_ are not allowed to spy on publicly.)
RajT88|4 months ago
URI's leak company secrets. I'm sure there's some people at Google using Edge which are leaking company data to Microsoft. I'm sure there's some people at Microsoft using Chrome which are leaking data to Google.
Edge and Chrome both send back every URI you visit to "improve search results" or to "sync history across devices". It's not clear if this includes private mode traffic or not (they don't say).
Huge privacy hole to allow this, and nobody seems to be aware or care.
fmobus|4 months ago
> there's some people at Google using Edge
I'd be surprised if it's more than a handful of people with explicit exceptions for work-related tasks. Chrome is the norm.
pengaru|4 months ago
zelos|4 months ago
Oops
NoiseBert69|4 months ago
Another round of OpSec training
rurban|4 months ago
The new German ecard patient system is also trivial to hack, as shown multiple times on CCC. As long as no one goes to jail, they will continue like this.
CGMthrowaway|4 months ago