[ishouldbework]

> It then removes any HTML entities that aren't allowed by the sanitizer configuration, and further removes any XSS-unsafe elements or attributes — whether or not they are allowed by the sanitizer configuration.

Emphasis mine. I do not understand this design choice. If I explicitly allow `script` tag, why should it be stripped?

If the method was called setXSSSafeSubsetOfHTML sure I guess, but feels weird for setHTML to have impossible-to-override filter.

[masklinn]

> feels weird for setHTML to have impossible-to-override filter.

It really doesn’t. We’ve decades of experience telling us that safe behaviour is critical.

> I do not understand this design choice. If I explicitly allow `script` tag, why should it be stripped?

Because there’s an infinitesimal number of situations where it’s not broken, and that means you should have to put in work to get there.

`innerHTML` still exists, and `setHTMLUnsafe` has no filtering whatsoever by default (not even the script deactivation innerHTML performs).

[ishouldbework]

I did not notice setHTMLUnsafe exists. That makes it (in my, unimportant, opinion) fine.

[strbean]

This is primarily an ergonomic addition, so it kinda makes sense to me to not make the dangerous footguns more ergonomic in the process. You can still assign `innerHTML` etc. to do the dangerous thing.

[meowface]

I agree, though I also agree with the parent that the method name is a little bit confusing. "safeSetHTML" or "setUntrustedHTML" or something would be clearer.

[hsbauauvhabzb]

Ideally this should be called dangerouslySetInnerHTML but hindsight blah blah

[evilpie]

If you want to use an XSS-unsafe Sanitizer you have to use setHTMLUnsafe.

[recursivecaveat]

You have to make the safe version the ergonomic one. Many many C++ memory bugs are a result of the standards committee making the undefined behaviour version of an operation even 3 characters shorter than the safe one. (They're still doing it too! I found another example added in C++23 recently)

[jmull]

I guess they are going for a safe default... the idea is people who don't carefully read the docs or carefully monitor the provenance of their dynamically generated HTML will probably reach for "setHTML()".

Meanwhile, there's "setHTMLUnsafe()" and, of course, good old .innerHTML.

[wewtyflakes]

Wouldn't that open the floodgates by allowing code that could itself call `setHTML` again but then further revise the args to escalate its privileges?

[systoll]

A script tag would be able to call setHTMLUnsafe, bypassing whatever sanitation you configured.

I’d’ve made it a runtime error to call setHTML with an unsafe config, but Javascript tends toward implicit reinterpretation rather than erroring-out.