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mschwaig | 3 months ago
Defenders should not have to engage in an costly and error-prone search of truth about what's actually deployed.
Systems should be composed from building blocks, the security of which can be audited largely independently, verifiably linking all of the source code, patches etc to some form of hardware attestation of the running system.
I think having an accurate, auditable and updatable description of systems in the field like that would be a significant and necessary improvement for defenders.
I'm working on automating software packaging with Nix as one missing piece of the puzzle to make that approach more accessible: https://github.com/mschwaig/vibenix
(I'm also looking for ways to get paid for working on that puzzle.)
XorNot|3 months ago
In fact figuring out what any given Nix config is actually doing is just about impossible and then you've got to work out what the config it's deploying actually does.
mschwaig|3 months ago
I also agree with you when it comes to the task of auditing every line of Nix code that factors into a given system. Nix doesn't really make things easier there.
The benefit I'm seeing really comes from composition making it easier to share and direct auditing effort.
All of the tricky code that's hard to audit should be relied on and audited by lots of people, while as a result the actual recipe to put together some specific package or service should be easier to audit.
Additionally, I think looking at diffs that represent changes to the system vs reasoning about the effects of changes made through imperative commands that can affect arbitrary parts of the system has similar efficiency gains.
xeonmc|3 months ago
cogogo|3 months ago
nradov|3 months ago
landtuna|3 months ago
elnerd|3 months ago
quinnjh|3 months ago
unknown|3 months ago
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