Several people either in this circuit or close by made submissions to this effect to ICANN recently.
It's very hard to get traction on this story because there is a lot of "don't prod the bear" regarding things ICANN can and should ask Department of State about, and things which really have moved into "self managed, independent international body" space. The reason there are two HSM east and west coast was because of this kind of national-strategic sensitivity. It would be a low bar (only money) decision to duplicate the investment in Singapore and Geneva, two locations which ICANN has existing investment in, with good secure facilities and accepted by the wider public as "neutral" points.
When the KSK ceremonies started up, several people also pointed out that this "diverse locations" thing was a bit hokey. The response above is my re-write of the kinds of things said to me, at the time. If somebody wants to deny State or any other US federal agency influenced the decision I have no formal proof.
I should add as a declaration of interest I was at Rob's goodbye KSK event, I am a TCR, and I made such a submission this year. I have not received any indication it was understood or read, despite asking for some acknowledgement, but the process wheels in an agency like ICANN run to their own time.
Asking the US Dept. of State would almost certainly result in "huh?" from the folks there. The part of the USG that plays in the ICANN kiddie pool is US Dept. of Commerce (NTIA) and they no longer have a veto on what ICANN does.
One of the issues is section 4.2 of the IANA Naming Functions contract:
"[...] Contractor must be able to demonstrate that all primary operations and systems will remain within the United States (including the District of Columbia). [...]"
The Key Management Facilities are considered a part of the "primary operations and systems". IIRC, this clause was included in order to move the transition of the IANA functions forward in the face of some resistance within the US government.
Until that bit of legalese is revised, there will be no movement on creating a non-US key management facility. I believe changing the IANA Functions contract requires the Customer Standing Committee. As far as I am aware, no one within the CSC thought it worth the effort, i.e., "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".
Perhaps under the current US administration, that feeling as changed, but I haven't heard of any significant efforts in that regard.
The USA has shown, over the last 12 months, what a security-conscious country it is. The Defense Secretary's almost fanantical regard for messaging security should be held up as an object lesson for all future generations.
ggm|3 months ago
It's very hard to get traction on this story because there is a lot of "don't prod the bear" regarding things ICANN can and should ask Department of State about, and things which really have moved into "self managed, independent international body" space. The reason there are two HSM east and west coast was because of this kind of national-strategic sensitivity. It would be a low bar (only money) decision to duplicate the investment in Singapore and Geneva, two locations which ICANN has existing investment in, with good secure facilities and accepted by the wider public as "neutral" points.
When the KSK ceremonies started up, several people also pointed out that this "diverse locations" thing was a bit hokey. The response above is my re-write of the kinds of things said to me, at the time. If somebody wants to deny State or any other US federal agency influenced the decision I have no formal proof.
I should add as a declaration of interest I was at Rob's goodbye KSK event, I am a TCR, and I made such a submission this year. I have not received any indication it was understood or read, despite asking for some acknowledgement, but the process wheels in an agency like ICANN run to their own time.
tptacek|3 months ago
dc396|3 months ago
One of the issues is section 4.2 of the IANA Naming Functions contract:
"[...] Contractor must be able to demonstrate that all primary operations and systems will remain within the United States (including the District of Columbia). [...]"
The Key Management Facilities are considered a part of the "primary operations and systems". IIRC, this clause was included in order to move the transition of the IANA functions forward in the face of some resistance within the US government.
Until that bit of legalese is revised, there will be no movement on creating a non-US key management facility. I believe changing the IANA Functions contract requires the Customer Standing Committee. As far as I am aware, no one within the CSC thought it worth the effort, i.e., "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".
Perhaps under the current US administration, that feeling as changed, but I haven't heard of any significant efforts in that regard.
charcircuit|3 months ago
shmel|3 months ago
monkey_monkey|3 months ago