Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

[amelius]

> Of course, we need to make sure that the data isn't modified on the way from the client.

Why is this necessary if every layer of the onion is a trustable encrypted link?

[MzxgckZtNqX5i]

Relays can be malicious and try to tamper with the data. Think of Tor relay encryption like Signal's E2E encryption, where the relays are analogous to Signal's servers. You want to ensure they can neither see what you sent (confidentiality) nor modify it without detection (integrity).

[47282847]

Cool! Congrats! Awesome work.

Small typo: “observing predicatable changes“

[sevg]

I think you’re getting downvoted because you’re reporting the typo in an odd and likely unproductive place.

I’m not sure what you expect HN readers to do about the typo. There is a comment section on the blog itself :)

[greekrich92]

Is it quantum-proof?

[vscode-rest]

Quantum isn’t the problem. Majority-internet telemetry is.

[ekjhgkejhgk]

Is it alien-proof?

[m00dy]

hey guys, anyone believes Tor still can provide anonymity to users ? just trying to ask politely.

[dannyobrien]

broadly yes, but the real question is: what's your threat model? https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/threat-model

[ongy]

Low stakes (IP violations etc.): absolutely

High stakes (military / nation state scale): no

[lurker_jMckQT99]

hey, would you mind elaborating (with sources)?

[jstanley]

This FUD comes up whenever Tor is mentioned on Hacker News. The answer is: let's say you think Tor isn't 100% flawless. What are you going to do? Not use Tor? It's better than any other option.