[mulmboy]

It does largely avoid the issue if you configure to allow only specific environments AND you require reviews before pushing/merging to branches in that environment.

https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/adding-a-publisher/

For a malicious version to be published would then require full merge which is a fairly high bar.

AWS allows similar

[LtWorf]

As we're seeing, properly configuring github actions is rather hard. By default force pushes are allowed on any branch.

[mulmboy]

Yes and anyone who knows anything about software dev knows that the first thing you should do with an important repo is set up branch protections to disallow that, and require reviews etc. Basic CI/CD.

This incident reflects extremely poorly on PostHog because it demonstrates a lack of thought to security beyond surface level. It tells us that any dev at PostHog has access at any time to publish packages, without review (because we know that the secret to do this is accessible from plain GHA secret which can be read from any GHA run which presumably run on any internal dev's PR). The most charitable interpretation of this is that it's consciously justified by them because it reduces friction, in which case I would say that demonstrates poor judgement, a bad balance.

A casual audit would have revealed this and suggested something like restricting the secret to a specific GHA environment and requiring reviews to push to that env. Or something like that.