[jessriedel]

I thought some combination of error correction and redundant systems was already widespread in airplanes to prevent cosmic-ray induced errors. (GPT agrees.) What am I missing? I've read multiple articles on this, and none of them address the fact that the problem, at the level of detail described in the article, should have been prevented by technology available and widely deployed for decades.

[pengaru]

> GPT agrees

What do you think this adds? These things are sycophant confident idiots; they will agree and agree they're incorrect at the slightest challenge in the same interaction.

[jessriedel]

I'm quite aware of the limitations. That's why I bothered to post a comment. But it's definitely better to do due diligence by asking first, since many responses can then be checked. Mentioning it in the comment shows the effort, similar to "Google turned up nothing".

[RealityVoid]

You're missing that the systems were designed in the 90's and they had no edac on them but instead relied on redundancy and a consensus system. The fact bit flips happened is not why they grounded the things and updated sw, they grounded them to address the consensus algorithm in the other CPU that did not get the bit flips.

[jessriedel]

Do you have a source on that? The current article describes the software very differently:

> In any case, the software updates rolled out by the company appear to be quick and easy to install. Many airlines completed them within hours. The software works by inducing "rapid refreshing of the corrupted parameter so it has no time to have effect on the flight controls", Airbus says. This is, in essence, a way of continually sanitising computer data on these aircraft to try and ensure that any errors don't end up actually impacting a flight.