[voidnap]

It isn't victim blaming. People like you make it impossible to avoid attacks like these because you have no appetite for a better security model.

I run npm under bubblewrap because npm has a culture of high risk; of using too many dependencies from untrusted authors. But being scrupulous and responsible is a cost I pay with my time and attention. But it is important because if I run some untrusted code and am compromised it can affect others.

But that is challenging when every time some exploit rolls around people, like you, brush it off as "unlucky". As if to say it's inavoidable. That nobody can be expected to be responsible for the libraries they use because that is too hard or whatever. You simply lack the appetite for good hygene and it makes it harder for the minority of us who care about how our actions affect others.

[VPenkov]

> you have no appetite for a better security model

For what it's worth, there are some advancements. PNPM - the packager used in this case - doesn't automatically run postinstall scripts. In this case, either the engineer allowed it explicitly, or a transitive dependency was previously considered safe, and allowed by default, but stopped being safe.

PNPM also lets you specify a minimum package age, so you cannot install packages younger than X. The combination of these would stop most attacks, but becomes less effective if everyone specifies a minimum package age, so no one would fall victim.

It's a bit grotesque because the system relies on either the package author noticing on time, or someone falling victim and reporting it.

NPM now supports publishing signed packages, and PNPM has a trustPolicy flag. This is a step in a good direction, but is still not enough, because it relies on publishers to know and care about signing packages, and it relies on consumers to require it.

There _is_ appetite for a better security model, but a lot of old, ubiquitous packages, are unmaintained and won't adopt it. The ecosystem is evolving, but very slowly, and breaking changes seem needed.

[VPenkov]

I had the chance to finish reading and it looks like Trigger were using an older version of PNPM which didn't do any of the above, and have since implemented everything I've mentioned in my post, plus some additional Git security.

So a slight amendment there on the human error side of things.

[vasco]

What no appetite? I just don't like your solution. The industry needs an answer to this problem stat, and it can't be "just read the code before".

[voidnap]

At some point you must be open to being compelled to read code you run or ship. Otherwise, if that's to hard, then I don't know what to tell you. We'll just never agree.

If you find a better solution than being responsible for what you do and who you trust, I'm all for it. Until then, that's part of the job.

When I was a junior, our company payed a commercial license for some of the larger libraries we used and it included support. Or manage risk by using fewer and more trustworthy projects like Django instead of reaching for a new dependency from some random person every time you need to solve a simple problem.

> What no appetite? I just don't like your solution.

When I say "appetite" I am being very deliberate. You are hungry but you won't eat your vegetables. When you say "I just don't like your vegetables", then you aren't that hungry. You don't have the appetite. You'd rather accept the risk. Which is fine but then don't complain when stuff like this happens and everyone is compromised.

[godelski]

No, you are the problem because you have a higher expectation than reality. People shouldn't have to run npm in containers. You're over simplifying with one case where you have found one solution while ignoring the identical problems elsewhere. You are preventing us from looking at other solutions because you think the one you have is enough and works for everyone.

[voidnap]

I agree with you that I shouldn't have to treat my libraries like untrusted code. I don't know what the rest of your comment means. I don't see how I'm preventing anybody from looking at other solutions to npm, they just don't want to do it because it's hard. And I have similar criticisms for cargo as it just copies npm and inherits all of its problems. I hate that.

npm has had a bad ecosystem since its inception. The left-pad thing being some of my earliest memories of it [1]. So none of this is new.

But all of this is still an issue because it's too convenient and that's the most important thing. Even cargo copies npm because they want to be seen as convenient and the risk is acknowledged. Nobody has the appetite to be held accountable for who they put their trust in.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Npm_left-pad_incident