[theropost]

I think this kind of critique often leans too hard on “security through obscurity” as a cheap punchline, without acknowledging that real systems are layered, pragmatic, and operated by humans with varying skill levels. An open firmware repository, by itself, is not a failure. In many cases it is the opposite: transparency that allows scrutiny, reproducibility, and faster remediation. The real risk is not that attackers can see firmware, but that defenders assume secrecy is doing work that proper controls should be doing anyway.

What worries me more is security through herd mentality, where everyone copies the same patterns, tooling, and assumptions. When one breaks, they all break. Some obscurity, used deliberately, can raise the bar against casual incompetence and lazy attacks, which, frankly, account for far more incidents than sophisticated adversaries. We should absolutely design systems that are easy to operate safely, but there is a difference between “simple to use” and “safe to run critical infrastructure.” Not every button should be green, and not every role should be interchangeable. If an approach only works when no one understands it, that is bad security. But if it fails because operators cannot grasp basic layered defenses, that is a staffing and governance problem, not a philosophy one.

[void-star]

I’m beginning to think maybe I’m the only one that read this whole thing. The firmware storage isn’t the security through obscurity problem being talked about here. The hardcoded TLS private key definitely is though. And yes, it deserves shaming… terrible practice leads to terrible outcomes. Nobody is surprised that this is coming from tp-link at this point though.

[fn-mote]

> An open firmware repository, by itself, is not a failure

Isn’t the complaint that the location of the repo is not publicized?

Nobody would complain if it were linked directly from the company’s web page, I assume?