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naoru | 2 months ago
> According to The Cybersec Guru, this is an unpatchable problem for Sony, because these keys cannot be changed and are burned directly in the APU.
I'm just speculating at this point, but what could prevent Sony from anticipating this exact situation and burning several keys in the APU? I mean, eFuse is not exactly a new technology. That way, once a key is leaked, Sony could push a firmware update switching the APU to a new key which hasn't been leaked yet.
bri3d|1 month ago
If keys are recovered using some form of low level hardware attack, as was almost surely the case here, the attacker can usually recover the unused key sets too.
If the chip manufacturing provisioning supply chain is leaky the new keys will probably be disclosed anyway, and if the key custody chain is broken (ie, keys are shared with OEMs or third parties) they will definitely be disclosed anyway.
trebligdivad|1 month ago
unknown|1 month ago
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EPWN3D|1 month ago
firesteelrain|1 month ago
ghshephard|1 month ago
toast0|1 month ago
So if v1 is signed by key A, v2 is signed by key B and invalidates key A; a console that installs v2 wouldn't be able to install v1 after, but that's not a problem for Sony.
But, I'm not sure how many companies would be able to manage their keys properly to ensure that someone with access to key A doesn't have access to key B.
If these are asymmetric key pairs and the device side key was extracted from the device... Switching keys wouldn't help, and it's not a huge deal by itself --- having the device side key doesn't allow you to make a firmware image the device would accept.
unknown|1 month ago
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j45|1 month ago