[rossjudson]

Google "intel sgx memory encryption engine". Intel's designers were fully aware of replay attacks, and early versions of SGX supported a hardware-based memory encryption engine with Merkle tree support.

Remember that everything in security (and computation) is a tradeoff. The MEE turned out to be a performance bottleneck, and support got dropped.

There are legitimate choices to be made here between threat models, and the resulting implications on the designs.

There's not much new under the sun when it comes to security/cryptography/whatever (tm), and I recommend approaching the choices designers make with an open mind.

[fc417fc802]

I agree with the sentiment but I'm struggling to see how this qualifies as a legitimate tradeoff to make. I thought the entire point of this feature was to provide assurances to customers that cloud providers weren't snooping on their VMs. In which case physically interdicting RAM in this manner is probably the first approach a realistic adversary would attempt.

I can see where it prevents inadvertent data leaks but the feature was billed as protecting against motivated adversaries. (Or at least so I thought.)