I don't know if I missed something, but this CVE isn't that major as it was suggested to be? For one it had to originate from app.opencode.com and even if it didn't most (good) browsers block websites from probing localhost. Yes it is still a pretty bad CVE, but not as critical as some might suggest.
> For one it had to originate from app.opencode.com
No, that was the initial mitigation! Before the vulnerability was reported, the server was accessible to the entire world with a wide-open CORS policy.
I have a hypothesis why issues like that are so widespread. That AI infrastructure is mostly developed by large companies; their business model is selling software as a service at scale. Hence containers, micro-services, TCP/IP in between. That approach is reasonable for data centres because these made of multiple servers i.e. need networking, and they have private virtual networks just to connect servers so the security consequences aren’t too bad.
If they were designing these infrastructure pieces primarily for consumer use, they would have used named pipes, Unix domain sockets, or some other local-only IPC method instead of TCP/IP.
Historically at least there have been some established high trust projects for which curl | bash made sense. But with AI the scene is full of grifters and vibe coders so we can't have nice things.
> a RCE vulnerability is the type of thing that nation state actors in Russia and North Korea dream of
Does this mean other state actors are beyond needs of RCE vulns as their tools belt and North Korea and Russia lagging behind? Some other interpretation from security-involved practitioners here - like, I don't know - we already have Pegasus, phew on OpenCode RCE?
> Does this mean other state actors are beyond needs of RCE vulns
No, from experience, any nation state actor would love to take advantage of a RCE vuln: this was painted from the perspective of Bottlerocket which is in use by DoD, NSA, etc.
The one thing here confusing to me is the past tense used throughout. This CVE seems presented as both past and present, yet the present evidence isn't... Presented.
unknown|1 month ago
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kachapopopow|1 month ago
rafram|1 month ago
No, that was the initial mitigation! Before the vulnerability was reported, the server was accessible to the entire world with a wide-open CORS policy.
https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/commit/7d2d87fa2c44e32...
Const-me|1 month ago
If they were designing these infrastructure pieces primarily for consumer use, they would have used named pipes, Unix domain sockets, or some other local-only IPC method instead of TCP/IP.
keyle|1 month ago
These local agents that you spawn and give access to your drive are kind of insane to me.
It's at the level of
which you cannot inspect, and may be well different every time you interact with it!As per usual, being at the forefront of the tech world is leaving behind privacy and security in the dust... until something bad happens.
globular-toast|1 month ago
add-sub-mul-div|1 month ago
CoolCold|1 month ago
Does this mean other state actors are beyond needs of RCE vulns as their tools belt and North Korea and Russia lagging behind? Some other interpretation from security-involved practitioners here - like, I don't know - we already have Pegasus, phew on OpenCode RCE?
jpmcb|1 month ago
No, from experience, any nation state actor would love to take advantage of a RCE vuln: this was painted from the perspective of Bottlerocket which is in use by DoD, NSA, etc.
geoffmanning|1 month ago
jpmcb|1 month ago
* Not running the server by default * Patched the wide open CORS policy which left the server open to execution by any page you visited.
The server is still there but you have to explicitly enable it via `opencode serve`
The original disclosure has a table of fixes that have landed: https://cy.md/opencode-rce/
notnullorvoid|1 month ago