[rainsford]

Looking at it in terms of the direct near-term military benefit of NATO in a conflict with China is focusing on the wrong thing. The real question isn't how strongly NATO membership would directly benefit the US military in a conflict with China; it's how strongly the act of blowing up the NATO relationship would negatively impact the US ability to deal with China in a future conflict. And those are two extremely different questions.

Are the French going to be parking the Charles de Gaulle alongside American aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait if push comes to shove in the Pacific? I wouldn't entirely discount it. But maybe more importantly, even if they're not, does making an enemy of the EU negatively impact the ability of the US to park American aircraft carriers there? Certainly damage to the Atlantic trade relationship is unlikely to do the US any favors economically, which is important if the US wants to keep funding the Navy. And a potential loss of European controlled military bases has the potential to negative effect the US military's logistics, which is where the real superpower status comes from. Maybe most significantly, how would such a shift in alliances impact the willingness of Pacific allies to support the US, which obviously does have a direct impact on any conflict with China.