[zajio1am]

RFC 4787 does not really describe how real world implementations behave. As almost all SOHO routers are Linux-based, i prefer to discuss Linux netfilter-based NAT behavior than some hypothetical RFC 4787 NAT. There are clear differences. For example, RFC 4787 says:

> REQ-1: A NAT MUST have an "Endpoint-Independent Mapping" behavior

While Linux netfilter behavior is "Address and Port-Dependent Mapping".

As Linux netfilter implements both NAT and firewall behavior, it is relevant for the discussion which parts of overall netfilter behavior falls into 'NAT part' and which into 'firewall part'. There is clear distinction - DNAT/SNAT rules in nat table represent NAT behavior, while REJECT/DROP rules in filter table represent firewall behavior.

As Linux-based SOHO routers are usually configured with both NAT and firewall netfilter rules to implement both NAT and firewall behavior, one cannot answer question 'Does NAT filter traffic?' based on external behavior of such SOHO routers, but has to analyze which part of the network stack is responsible for such behavior, or how the same network stack configured with just NAT rules and no firewall rules would behave. And here the answer is no, it would pass traffic (that do not match existing connections) unmodified.

[deng]

The problem is: what is an implementation detail, and what is NAT as a concept? This line is very blurry. The RFC does not really distinguish this and also doesn't want to. As it says, it tries to document behavior and explicitly uses the term "NAT filtering". When we say "This box here does NAT", then we implicitly assume this behavior. You might argue that implicit is not good, and I would agree (this is the advantage of ipv6 with firewall: filtering is explicit rather than implicit). However, if someone tells me "Well actually, NAT does not do filtering, the firewall does", then to me this is similar to arguing with staff in a supermarket that the tomato belongs in the berries section.

I also want to make clear that I fully agree with the article's main point: NAT's primary purpose was and still is address conservation, and that ipv6 is no less secure than ipv4. I do disagree though with the notion that "NAT does not do filtering" or that "NAT does not provide any security".

[Dagger2]

NAT:

    iptables -A POSTROUTING -o wan0 -j MASQUERADE

Firewall:

    iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
    iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state INVALID -j DROP
    iptables -A FORWARD -i lan0 -j ACCEPT
    iptables -A FORWARD -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-admin-prohibited

If you omit the first line, you get firewalling without NAT. If you omit the second set of lines, you get NAT without firewalling. This should make it pretty clear that they're orthogonal features.

If NAT functioned as an inbound firewall, the second set of lines wouldn't be necessary and removing them wouldn't let you make inbound connections. But you can just test it yourself, and you'll see that NATing your outbound connections doesn't block new inbound ones.

[Denatonium]

All the Linux routers I've used utilize Endpoint-Independent mapping with Address- and Port-Dependent _filtering_.

This means you can still establish direct P2P connectivity behind a Linux-based NAT device with users behind other Linux-based NAT devices. The only time it becomes an issue is when attempting to communicate with users behind NAT devices that do Address-Dependent _mapping_ or Address and Port-Dependent _mapping_. Some *BSD-based NAT implementations are this way.

Endpoint-independent _filtering_ is only a good idea for CGNAT implementations. Having an EIM/EIF NAT/firewall setup without additional firewalling makes it possible and easy for devices to run public-facing UDP-based servers without anyone's knowledge. With EIM/EIF, once you create a NAT mapping, so long as you send out periodic keepalives, _any_ IP address with _any_ source port can make unsolicited connections to a server that the NAT mapping points to. The best compromise is Endpoint-independent mapping with Address- (but not port-) dependent filtering.