[sedawkgrep]

yeah but the likelihood of this is incredibly remote. It would shock me if ISPs didn't have alarms going off if RFC1918 space was suddenly routable within their BGP table.

Not to mention the return packet would be NAT'd so the attacker would have to deal with that complication.

[bandrami]

You're missing the part where the ISP is the one doing it

[ErroneousBosh]

Mm. Can you give an example of that happening in real life?

[Dagger2]

The return packet wouldn't be NATed, because stateful NAT tracks connections and only applies NAT to packets that belong to outbound connections.

Arguing over how likely this is is missing the point. If it can happen at all when you're running NAT, then it should be clear that NAT isn't providing security.

[kortilla]

“if it protects 99.999% of attackers from reaching you but not this one specific attacker in this one case of misconfiguration, it’s not providing security”…

Dude, that’s a really shitty take and this is why people that do care about security end up ignoring advice from anyone who thinks this way.

You’re in the camp of “don’t use condoms because they can break”.