[W_rey45]

Great question this is exactly the tension we’re trying to be explicit about.

CIRCE separates cryptographic verification from semantic interpretation. The signature covers a minimal, stable signed_block (canonicalized → hashed → signed). Everything else is metadata that can evolve without affecting verification.

Older receipts remain verifiable because the verifier only assumes the signed scope + canonicalization rules. Newer tooling can understand more fields, but must ignore unknown/missing fields (JWT / signed artifact style). We also include a schema identifier/hash for tooling selection, but it’s intentionally not security-critical — verification is purely about integrity.

Also: toran.sh’s angle is super aligned. Capturing actual API request/response outside the agent’s control feels like the “ground truth” complement to CIRCE’s “decision truth.” Curious: are you anchoring the API transcript via a sidecar/proxy with its own signing key, or are you doing something like a transparency log/Merkle chain for requests?