[scbzzzzz]

What do OnePlus gain from this? Can someone explain me what are the advantages of OnePlus doing all this? A failed update resulting in motherboard replacement? More money, more shareholders are happy?

I still sometimes ponder if oneplus green line fiasco is a failed hardware fuse type thing that got accidentally triggered during software update. (Insert I can't prove meme here).

[TomatoCo]

My understanding is there was a bug that let you wipe and re-enable a phone that had been disabled due to theft. This prevents a downgrade attack. It's in OnePlus's interest to make their phones less appealing for theft, or, in their interest to comply with requirements to be disableable from carriers, Google, etc.

[Zigurd]

Carriers can check a registry of stolen phone IMEIs and block them from their networks.

[scbzzzzz]

Make perfect sense, Thanks kind stranger. Hope it is the reason and not some corporate greed. It on me, lately my thoughts are defaulted towards corporates sabotaging consumers. I need to work on it.

The effects on custom os community is causing me worried ( I am still rocking my oneplus 7t with crdroid and oneplus used to most geek friendly) Now I am wondering if there are other ways they could achieved the same without blowing a fuse or be more transparent about this.

[HiPhish]

> It's in OnePlus's interest to make their phones less appealing for theft,

I don't believe for a second that this benefits phone owners in any way. A thief is not going to sit there and do research on your phone model before he steals it. He's going to steal whatever he can and then figure out what to do with it.

[wnevets]

> My understanding is there was a bug that let you wipe and re-enable a phone that had been disabled due to theft. This prevents a downgrade attack.

This makes sense and much less dystopia than some of the other commenters are suggesting.

[jeroenhd]

Their low-level bootloader code contains a vulnerability that allows an attacker with physical access to boot an OS of their choice.

Android's normal bootloader unlock procedure allows for doing so, but ensures that the data partition (or the encryption keys therefore) are wiped so that a border guard at the airport can't just Cellebrite the phone open.

Without downgrade protection, the low-level recovery protocol built into Qualcomm chips would permit the attacker to load an old, vulnerable version of the software, which has been properly signed and everything, and still exploit it. By preventing downgrades through eFuses, this avenue of attack can be prevented.

This does not actually prevent running custom ROMs, necessarily. This does prevent older custom ROMs. Custom ROMs developed with the new bootloader/firmware/etc should still boot fine.

This is why the linked article states:

> The community recommendation is that users who have updated should not flash any custom ROM until developers explicitly announce support for fused devices with the new firmware base.

Once ROM developers update their ROMs, the custom ROM situation should be fine again.

[g947o]

That makes sense, but how would an attacker flash an older version of the firmware in the first place? Don't you need developer options and unlocking + debugging enabled?

[Snoozus]

thank you for this, I have a follow up question: Now an attacker can not install an old, vulnerable version. But couldn't they just install a new, vulnerable version? Is there something that enforces encryption key deletion in one case and not the other?

[drnick1]

> What do OnePlus gain from this? Can someone explain me what are the advantages of OnePlus doing all this?

They don't want the hardware to be under your control. In the mind of tech executives, selling hardware does not make enough money, the user must stay captive to the stock OS where "software as a service" can be sold, and data about the user can be extracted.

[jeroenhd]

A bit overdramatic, isn't it? Custom ROMs designed for the new firmware revisions still work fine. Only older ROMs with potentially vulnerable bootloader code cause bricking risks.

Give ROM developers a few weeks and you can boot your favourite custom ROMs again.

[zb3]

Note that Google also forces this indirectly via their "certification" - if the device doesn't have unremovable AVB (requires qualcomm secure boot fuse to be blown) then it's not even allowed to say the device runs Android.. if you see "Android™" then it means secure boot is set up and you don't have the keys, you can't set up your own, so you don't really own the SoC you paid for..

[palata]

> In the mind of tech executives

To be fair, they are right: the vast majority of users don't give a damn. Unfortunately I do.

[rvnx]

It is the same concept on an iPhone, you have 7 days to downgrade, then it is permanently impossible. Not for technical reasons, but because of an arbitrary lock (achieved through signature).

OnePlus just chose the hardware way, versus Apple the signature way

Whether for OnePlus or Apple, there should definitively be a way to let users sign and run the operating system of their choice, like any other software.

(still hating this iOS 26, and the fact that even after losing all my data and downgrading back iOS 18 it refused to re-sync my Apple Watch until iOS 26 was installed again, shitty company policy)

[Muromec]

> Not for technical reasons, but because of an arbitrary lock (achieved through signature).

There is a good reason to prevent downgrades -- older versions have CVEs and some are actually exploitable.