It's not silly, for many types of games, having access to privileged information on the client is simply a necessity. Any multiplayer FPS client will have to know the positions of other players before they come into view for latency reasons. The client will have to know exact origin points of any sounds other players might make. Player models fully occluded by transparency effects will still have to be rendered and cheaters could just forgo the transparency pass all together. Same story with things like overlay effects and postprocessing (flash bangs, blurry vision, b&w image, ...). Texture changes can give a visibility advantage. The list goes on and on. Developers rely on client-side AC out of necessity, not out of ignorance.
> Importantly, this work also highlights the defensive implications of such techniques. While Secure Boot and firmware integrity mechanisms would prevent this attack chain when correctly enforced, the explicit requirement for users to disable Secure Boot demonstrates how social and usability tradeoffs continue to undermine otherwise effective platform defenses.
There are a number of Microsoft-signed drivers that have vulnerabilities in them that can be exploited allowing kernel-level access (memory read/write primitives, etc.) - they would load fine under Secure Boot - and, indeed, malware already has exploited this before.
This does make cheating harder, and does make it a cat-and-mouse game where signatures are revoked and they move on to a new driver, but the fact of the matter is - there are a ton of drivers out there and some of them will always be vulnerable in some way. To this end, I think focusing on client-side anti-cheat at all is a lost cause.
Valorant and Battlefield 6 does require secure boot and they do not sell their cheat for those games. Though there are still cheats available for those games, in particular using DMA hardware.
You connect the DMA PCIe card to a laptop/pc with USB, then it can read any memory on the game PC and display a radar on the laptop screen. They even sell mouse and hdmi/dp mergers, these allow the laptop to show an ESP overlay over your game and aimbotting by sending mouse inputs.
No. That's too soft. We should go one step further and make computers immutable appliances the moment any game is installed, or maybe out of the box.
macOS, Windows and Linux has the technology. Why wait? Kill general purpose comp^H^H^H^H^ communism right now! Protect the children, save the capit^H^H^H^H nation!
kuschku|18 days ago
That's such a hilarious quote, as it explains exactly why client-side anti-cheat is silly in the first place.
B3L|17 days ago
charcircuit|17 days ago
Hikikomori|17 days ago
unknown|18 days ago
[deleted]
not_a9|18 days ago
mafriese|18 days ago
> Importantly, this work also highlights the defensive implications of such techniques. While Secure Boot and firmware integrity mechanisms would prevent this attack chain when correctly enforced, the explicit requirement for users to disable Secure Boot demonstrates how social and usability tradeoffs continue to undermine otherwise effective platform defenses.
arcfour|17 days ago
This does make cheating harder, and does make it a cat-and-mouse game where signatures are revoked and they move on to a new driver, but the fact of the matter is - there are a ton of drivers out there and some of them will always be vulnerable in some way. To this end, I think focusing on client-side anti-cheat at all is a lost cause.
Hikikomori|17 days ago
You connect the DMA PCIe card to a laptop/pc with USB, then it can read any memory on the game PC and display a radar on the laptop screen. They even sell mouse and hdmi/dp mergers, these allow the laptop to show an ESP overlay over your game and aimbotting by sending mouse inputs.
hrimfaxi|17 days ago
cancername|18 days ago
direwolf20|21 days ago
bayindirh|17 days ago
macOS, Windows and Linux has the technology. Why wait? Kill general purpose comp^H^H^H^H^ communism right now! Protect the children, save the capit^H^H^H^H nation!
hollow-moe|18 days ago