This is technically true, and nobody contested the CABF's focus on HTTPS TLS.
However, eventually, the CABF started imposing restrictions on the public CA operators regarding the issuance of non-HTTPS certificates. Nominally, the CAs are still offering "TLS certificates", but due to the pressure from the CABF, the allowed certificates are getting more and more limited, with the removal of SRVname a few years ago, and the removal of clientAuth that this thread is about.
I can understand the CABF position of "just make your own PKI" to a degree, but in practice that would require a LetsEncrypt level of effort for something that is already perfectly provided by LetsEncrypt, if it wouldn't be for the CABF lobbying.
> CABF started imposing restrictions on the public CA operators regarding the issuance of non-HTTPS certificates.
The restriction is on signing non web certificates with the same root/intermediate as is part of the WebPKI.
There's no rule (that I'm aware of?) that says the CAs can't have different signing roots for whatever use-case that are then trusted by people who need that use case.
> The CA/Browser Forum is a voluntary organization of Certification Authorities and suppliers of Internet browser and other relying‐party software applications.
IMHO "other relying-party software applications" can include XMPP servers (also perhaps SMTP, IMAP, FTPS, NNTP, etc).
ge0rg|19 days ago
However, eventually, the CABF started imposing restrictions on the public CA operators regarding the issuance of non-HTTPS certificates. Nominally, the CAs are still offering "TLS certificates", but due to the pressure from the CABF, the allowed certificates are getting more and more limited, with the removal of SRVname a few years ago, and the removal of clientAuth that this thread is about.
I can understand the CABF position of "just make your own PKI" to a degree, but in practice that would require a LetsEncrypt level of effort for something that is already perfectly provided by LetsEncrypt, if it wouldn't be for the CABF lobbying.
growse|19 days ago
The restriction is on signing non web certificates with the same root/intermediate as is part of the WebPKI.
There's no rule (that I'm aware of?) that says the CAs can't have different signing roots for whatever use-case that are then trusted by people who need that use case.
throw0101a|19 days ago
[citation needed]
The title of their current (2.2.2) standard is "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted TLS Server Certificates":
* https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirem...
§1.3, "PKI Participants", states:
> The CA/Browser Forum is a voluntary organization of Certification Authorities and suppliers of Internet browser and other relying‐party software applications.
IMHO "other relying-party software applications" can include XMPP servers (also perhaps SMTP, IMAP, FTPS, NNTP, etc).
growse|19 days ago
My citation is the membership of the CAB.
> IMHO "other relying-party software applications" can include XMPP servers (also perhaps SMTP, IMAP, FTPS, NNTP, etc).
This may be your opinion, but what's the representation of XMPP etc. software maintainers at the CAB?