[krethh]

> define communication protocols between them that fail when prompt injections are present

There's the "draw the rest of the owl" of this problem.

Until we figure out a robust theoretical framework for identifying prompt injections (not anywhere close to that, to my knowledge - as OP pointed out, all models are getting jailbroken all the time), human-in-the-loop will remain the only defense.

[CuriouslyC]

Human in the loop isn't the only defense, you can't achieve complete injection coverage, but you can have an agent convert untrusted input into a response schema with a canary field, then fail any agent outputs that don't conform to the schema or don't have the correct canary value. This works because prompt injection scrambles instruction following, so the odds that the injection works, the isolated agent re-injects into the output, and the model also conforms to the original instructions regarding schema and canary is extremely low. As long as the agent parsing untrusted content doesn't have any shell or other exfiltration tools, this works well.

[krethh]

This only works against crude attacks which will fail the schema/canary check, but does next to nothing for semantic hijacking, memory poisoning and other more sophisticated techniques.