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grishka | 10 days ago
IMO the whole PKI thing is a terrible idea to begin with. It would make much more sense to tie the trust in TLS to DNS somehow, since the certificates themselves depend on domains anyway. Then you would only have a single root of trust, and that would be your DNS provider (or the root servers). And nothing will expire ever again.
westurner|10 days ago
Over a long enough timeline, there will be vulns discovered in so much of the software that guards the CA certs in RAM
grishka|10 days ago
And what if the certificate is compromised before it expires? Right, there's a revocation mechanism for that. So why expire them then if they can be revoked anyway IF they get compromised?
The reason why domain TLS certificates expire is that domains can change owners. It makes sense that it should not be possible for someone to buy a domain for one year, get a non-expiring TLS certificate issued for it, and then have the ability to MitM its traffic if it ever gets bought by someone else later.
Domain certificates are sent as part of the connection handshake, so them expiring is unnoticeable for the end users. However, root certificates rely on the OS getting updates forever, which is unsustainable. Some systems lack the ability to install user-provided root CAs altogether, and some (Android) do allow it but treat them as second-class.
burnte|10 days ago
I'm completely serious when we need to abandon the ID verification part of certificates. That's an entirely separate problem from encryption protocol. An encryption protocol needs absolutely no expiration date, it's useful until it's broken, and no one can predict that. Identity should be verified in a separate path.
plq|10 days ago
wtallis|10 days ago
snowwrestler|10 days ago
grishka|10 days ago