[tripletao]

Nobody cares even then, because any bias due to theoretical deviation from k-equidistribution is negligible compared to the desired random variance, even if we average trials until the Sun burns out. By analogy, if we're generating an integer between 1 and 3 with an 8-bit PRNG without rejection, then we should worry about bias because 2^8 isn't a multiple of 3; but if we're using a 256-bit PRNG then we should not, even though 2^256 also isn't a multiple.

If you think there's any practical difference between a stream of true randomness and a modern CSPRNG seeded once with 256 bits of true randomness, then you should be able to provide a numerical simulation that detects it. If you (and, again, the world's leading cryptographers) are unable to adversarially create such a situation, then why are you worried that it will happen by accident?

SHA-1 is practically broken, in the sense that a practically relevant chosen-prefix attack can be performed for <$100k. This has no analogy with anything we're discussing here, so I'm not sure why you mentioned it.

You wrote:

> There are concepts like "k-dimensional equidistribution" etc. etc... where in some ways the requirements of a PRNG are far, far, higher than a cryptographically sound PRNG

I believe this claim is unequivocally false. A non-CS PRNG may be better because it's faster or otherwise easier to implement, but it's not better because it's less predictable. You've provided no reference for this claim except that PCG comparison table that I believe you've misunderstood per mananaysiempre's comments. It would be nice if you could either post something to support your claim or correct it.