(no title)
rawling | 8 days ago
Could you not in theory record the whole TLS transaction? Can it not be replayed later and re-verified?
Up until an old certificate leaks or is broken and you can fake anything "from back when it was valid", I guess.
rawling | 8 days ago
Could you not in theory record the whole TLS transaction? Can it not be replayed later and re-verified?
Up until an old certificate leaks or is broken and you can fake anything "from back when it was valid", I guess.
arboles|8 days ago
armchairhacker|8 days ago
The only way I know to ensure an archive isn’t tampered is to re-archive it. If you sent a site to archive.today, archive.org, megalodon.jp, and ghostarchive.org, it’s unlikely that all will be tampered in the same way.
justincormack|8 days ago
octoberfranklin|8 days ago
The technology for doing this is called a Zero Knowledge Proof TLS Oracle:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/447.pdf
https://tlsnotary.org
The 10k-foot view is that you pick the random numbers involved in the TLS handshake in a deterministic way, much like how zk proofs use the Fiat-Shamir transform. In other words, instead of using true randomness, you use some hash of the transcript of the handshake so far (sort of). Since TLS doesn't do client authentication the DH exchange involves randomness from the client.
For all the blockchain haters out there: cryptocurrency is the reason this technology exists. Be thankful.