Incidentally, this is the actual advice we give startups about fundraising at YC. This batch I finally wrote it all down, and the s2013 startups used it when raising money.
From my experience, one of the most important realizations of fundraising is that it's an enormous mind game.
The hardest part of fundraising was getting the startup to a point where I actually believed in it. When I looked at our projections and where the company could go, I was no longer thinking, "Yeah, if a miracle happens," but rather, "It'll be hard, but I really, really think we can do that. We just need some help to get there."
Fundraising was a relative cakewalk when I was no longer selling investors on our company; I was explaining to investors that we were taking off, and asking them if they'd like to jump on board.
I believe that making that mental transition (to believing in your company) impacts the way you approach other areas of your business as well (not just fundraising).
For instance, when courting a large potential client or partner, your confidence goes up and you are not selling, so much as explaining. People pick up on this, and your results will show it. Plus, it just plain feels better when you really believe in your company's potential vs. merely hoping.
When you talk to women your m.o. should be breadth-first search, weighted by expected value. You should always talk to women in parallel rather than serially. You can't afford the time it takes to talk to women serially, plus if you only talk to one woman at a time, they don't have the pressure of other women to make them act. But you shouldn't pay the same attention to every woman, because some are more promising prospects than others. The optimal solution is to talk to all potential women in parallel, but give higher priority to the more promising ones.
The analogy to dating is problematic. Such a strategy is indeed effective for dating, but feels mercenary or even sociopathic to most people. Making the analogy raises moral issues that aren't relevant to fundraising.
Essentially, they lead you on. They seem like they're about to invest right up till the moment they say no. If they even say no. Some of the worse ones never actually do say no; they just stop replying to your emails.
PG makes the comparison explicit later in the essay:
"There are many analogies between fundraising and dating, and this is one of the strongest. No one wants you if you seem desperate. And the best way not to seem desperate is not to be desperate. That's one reason we urge startups during YC to keep expenses low and to try to make it to ramen profitability before Demo Day. Though it sounds slightly paradoxical, if you want to raise money, the best thing you can do is get yourself to the point where you don't need to."
You'll notice a common theme in this (excellent) piece: it's for startups that have some reason to believe they can actually raise a bunch of money. Startups who have either sufficient demonstrable talent behind them, are growing in some interesting way, or some other form of validation.
If you can't find some confidence that you're in that group, find a way to delay fundraising: keep your job, do consulting, work on alternate revenue streams, whatever, because fundraising when you're no in the group the bulk of this article applies to - trying to fundraise is hell. Not just hell like "it's really, really hard and frustrating" but hell like you could actually lose yourself in it, like you could actually get destroyed by it.
I'd strongly recommend having a presentation in the pitch meeting. It helps control the flow of the meeting and ensure you cover all the important points.
My favorite thing about these essays, is summarized by PG's remark in this one: "sorry, we think you're great, but PG said startups shouldn't ___, and since we're new to fundraising, we feel like we have to play it safe."
The card it gives to inexperienced players. This whole thing feels like a way to even out the information asymmetry inherent in these transactions.
Unsurprisingly, excellent advice phrased as succinctly as it could be for such an enormous topic.
I'm glad Paul Graham think that decks are on the way out, because they're a ludicrous (or at least inefficient) way of understanding what a startup does. If you have a product, show me that. If you have financials, show me those. Otherwise it becomes a competition to see which companies can dedicate their design resources to make the prettiest deck, and which investors can do the math on your '30% growth' number to figure out that you're growing from 3 to 4 users.
The advice about valuation is also great. I listened in on a conversation with very smart founders who are used to optimizing things, and they were super concerned about having a great pre-money valuation. It's tempting to focus on it because it's your only benchmark at a really stressful stage, but if things go badly it won't matter, and if things go really well it... won't matter either.
Another problem with emailing decks is that investors read them and decide, without much feedback to the founders. When founders can talk through the deck interactively with investors, they can learn which parts work and which don't, and what questions are unanswered.
I think showing the product alone works well only if the investor is in the target audience. I just met with an entrepreneur who has what I believe is a great product, but the investors he has talked with so far are just not going to be users of it.
In his case, I think having a couple of slides to help demonstrate the problem is very helpful. Otherwise there isn't a sufficient aha moment when he gets to the solution.
I'm sure I'm not the only one thinking back on some long-ago startup and thinking, "Oh! Those assholes! I knew it!"
Not that what PG says here is exactly news to me at this point, but his wide experience and resulting confidence is fantastic confirmation of things that I now know to suspect, but at the time seemed so reasonable. Oh, you don't lead? Oh, you want to see just a little more progress? Well of course you do. And I, earnest nerd, took them at their word.
This is interesting and contradicts a bit of "disrupt" meme:
"You can't trust your intuitions. I'm going to give you a set of rules here that will get you through this process if anything will. At certain moments you'll be tempted to ignore them. So rule number zero is: these rules exist for a reason. You wouldn't need a rule to keep you going in one direction if there weren't powerful forces pushing you in another."
What this seems to be saying (to young people) is "it's ok to ignore what other older more experienced people say (or what established practices are) and try to disrupt in those situations because the guidelines and experience they have is bogus but I am telling you that my rules are right so just trust me".
Your intuitions != what older more experience people say
pg and YC has more qualified investing experience than probably any other "experienced person" you could talk to. When you are doing a startup, it's generally a good idea to focus on innovating in your core area of expertise - which would be some combination of product/market/technology - and take the best practices of all the other areas, like financing.
Do investors read these essays? You've had some strong words for some of the types, e.g. "contemptible subspecies of investor". Would any of them email you and say, hey man, f u?
I would imagine not. Not only is PG very influential at many of the companies these investors would want to invest in, but most of these investors are also going to be hesitant to out themselves as being a "contemptible subspecies of investor".
Everyone in the community reads these essays. I would hazard that pg's goal in them is to coach both startups AND investors in how to behave toward each other. In this case, such bold language is him saying, "don't be this guy".
"But the foundation of convincing investors is to seem formidable, and since this isn't a word most people use in conversation much, I should explain what it means. A formidable person is one who seems like they'll get what they want, regardless of whatever obstacles are in the way. Formidable is close to confident, except that someone could be confident and mistaken. Formidable is roughly justifiably confident."
For years I've been toying with making a start-up board game. This essay could easily serve as the basis for that.
Slight disagree with the line:
"For example, if a reputable investor is willing to invest on a convertible note, using standard paperwork, that is either uncapped or capped at a good valuation, you can take that without having to think."
A good valuation means you're going to have to think anyway and if you don't need it you don't need it so then you're just going to have an obligation + temptation to use the funds. There is no such thing as 'free money' and a convertible note is simply deferring a part of the process and you'll need to take care of it sooner or later by going for funding (or paying back the loan). So if you are not sure if you are going to do a follow up round just yet I'd advise against getting a convertible loan, you now have a good chunk of the hassle of having an investor without having properly gone through the process required. Of course you could simply bank the money and pay back the loan if you are still of the same opinion later on but this rarely happens. It's the start-up equivalent of easy credit card debt, and if the valuation turns out to be low you could end up regretting taking the money (for instance, you could lose control like this). Better to negotiate it when you're strong or if you feel very secure about your future valuation.
Having seen a lot of this from the other side of the table quite a few of the passages strike me as extremely negative about investors, I'm sure Paul has a ton more experience than I do so this carries a lot of weight with me but I don't recognize the behaviours he sketches with the investors that I normally work for. Maybe they are the exception (I'm sure they'd like to think that :) ), but I can't imagine it is this black.
Investors look at the process of investing mostly as risk elimination, and as a second best as risk reduction by enumerating the risks. If an investors bails at the last moment (for instance after you've already agreed on terms) that would either reflect very bad on the investor, or more commonly on the party invested in. It's not as clear-cut imo as it is sketched here that all start-ups are angelic and innocent and investors are all sharks to a man and employing dirty tactics to get you to sign on the dotted line.
Again, it's clear on which side my bread is buttered but I simply wouldn't work for investors deploying such tactics, but have yet to see this sort of behaviour in any VC of some stature. Otoh I've seen plenty of trickery by companies about to be invested in (and lots of good companies too).
The article gives valuable insights into raising capital and the art of negotiation in this domain.
Overall, negotiation and funding could almost be expressed as a rule table. Certain heuristics and rules. Rather than flip flopping strategies on how to negotiate and deal with investors, I think it may be good to have a set of rules/heuristics to follow and see if it leads to your goal. If it fails, alter it and see the result. Anyhow, thats what I intend to do for my company, GridCrowd.
For negotiation PG mentions that its may be ok to just admit your a noob or not knowledgeable on certain aspects of funding. I respectfully wonder if there is another stratedgy from what I've learnt in negotiations in the non-funding world?:
Negotiate from a perceived position of strength.
You don't have to say your a noob, miss the detail and expose it if it becomes necessary. This way you may be able to attain more action on behalf of the investor moving through their process. The noob strategy allows them to indicate a process that could be tailored to their advantage. I don't know investors, so its hard for me to understand their objectives and how they behave. I'll re-read PGs advise again, he does have great credibility and wiseness so maybe I need more study on this strategy.
"When everyone wants you, it's hard not to let it go to your head. Especially if till recently no one wanted you. But restrain yourself."
Reminds me of a great quote from a family member. When my cousin's son started playing football, my cousin told him "the first time you get into the endzone, act like you've been there before".
I have a question. Since I'm nowhere near the valley and the start-up community in my community might as well be non-existent, I was wondering how I might go about meeting and getting introductions to investors. Not being well connected with a very poor local community makes it hard for me to know where to start.
Since I'm nowhere near the valley and the start-up community in my community might as well be non-existent, I was wondering how I might go about meeting and getting introductions to investors.
In that case, it's probably good to think of ways to move to the valley.
It sounds like the only investors in your area are probably individuals who happen to be wealthy, i.e. potential angel investors. But outside of the valley, angels tend to be family or people you're already acquainted with. And even if you can get them to invest in you, they're going to be less experienced than valley angels, meaning they may be dangerous to you. E.g. they'll probably rely heavily on their lawyer to structure the deal, and since you're not in the valley, that lawyer probably isn't a startup specialist, so you'll need to be extra careful they're structuring the deal properly (and structuring your company properly, if they're incorporating you).
Investment can be had in places other than the valley, of course. But the reason you want to be in the valley is because (a) that's where the top investors are, and (b) there are a lot of them. Raising investment anywhere else therefore increases the risk of having bad terms forced on you by clueless angels or predatory VCs.
Choosing to seek investment in the valley is like choosing the high ground in a battle: it's naturally suited to protect you from dying. And since avoiding death is every startup's most important goal, the valley is therefore the most important place to be.
If you're a programmer, the best route to investors is probably through other programmers you know. If you know any who are founders or early employees at a startup, they can introduce you to their investors. They can also introduce you to other founders, who can introduce you to their investors.
Get 1,000 users in a month and you don't need any introductions. You can cold email them and they will jump you. Maybe not jump you, but that should give you an idea.
Don't waste any idea on fundraising until you have product fit, market fit and first initial traction. Trying to fund raise before that is the sign of an amateur and if you actually get an investor interested before product fit, you will get a very shitty deal and the whole process will kill you.
An interesting point here is arrogance towards investors. The art of "arrogance" is to be arrogant in what you are saying while being very kind and nice in the way you say it.
It's very hard as a first time founder to mimic the arrogance that is natural for experienced founders. If you can do it, it's great, if you can't, it will burn your bridges and blacklist you.^^
If you can pull it off though, you're the master. It's the pinnacle of hustling, having nothing to offer but being as confident as the next Mark Zuckerberg.
So you'd need to be as confident as Mark Zuckerberg when he had $1M users when you only have 1000 users. However, that also only works if you intrinsically think of yourself as a very high-value individual and if you have worked for several on you to think that way. Otherwise, investors will quickly spot your fake.
There's a lot of great advice in this post, and much of it rings true. Specifically, the following tidbits are true ~100% of the time in my limited experience:
- "Investors will try to lure you into fundraising when you're not. It's great for them if they can, because they can thereby get a shot at you before everyone else."
- "What investors would like to do, if they could, is wait. When a startup is only a few months old, every week that passes gives you significantly more information about them."
- "Though you can focus on different plans when talking to different types of investors, you should on the whole err on the side of underestimating the amount you hope to raise."
- "You will be in a much stronger position if your collection of plans includes one for raising zero dollars—i.e. if you can make it to profitability without raising any additional money."
- "If you have multiple founders, pick one to handle fundraising so the other(s) can keep working on the company."
- "It's a mistake to behave arrogantly to investors." (I also think it's a mistake for investors to behave arrogantly to founders)
That said, I wanted to comment on a few of the other points in this (awesome) essay:
"To founders, the behavior of investors is often opaque—partly because their motivations are obscure, but partly because they deliberately mislead you."
That's a strong statement. First, not all investors mislead -- many are honest people. Second, startups are also often guilty of misdirection, which doesn't mean you shouldn't call out shitty investors, but I do think you should call out both sides instead of making one side sound like the bad guy.
"Do you have to be introduced? In phase 2, yes."
I think this is true 95% of the time, but it's not 100% true. My partners and I get pitch decks emailed to us by random people. Most of the time the pitch decks are subpar, but I think that's because not being able to get a real intro is a sign that your team/idea/traction/something else is subpar. However, this is just a signal, and there is no rule - written or unwritten - that says "if we don't know the sender then the deck goes in the trash." If you email us something that falls within our thesis and looks promising, we'd love to talk to you.
"Never leave a meeting with an investor without asking what happens next. What more do they need in order to decide?"
This is great advice. Most founders we talk to already ask "what's next" at the end of a meeting, but not all of them do.
"And while most investors are influenced by how interested other investors are in you, there are some who have an explicit policy of only investing after other investors have. You can recognize this contemptible subspecies of investor because they often talk about "leads.""
I guess I'm one of the members of that contemptible subspecies. My partners and I are in the middle of raising a fund, but we were investing with our own money for the better part of this year. Our checks were too small to lead, but there were lots of startups that didn't have terms. If you're raising 1m on a 5m pre, then we don't need a lead to invest. If you're raising 1m-2m on a ??? pre, then we would prefer to wait to find out what ??? is. We're not super valuation sensitive, so 7m vs 8m is fine, but there's a big difference between a 6m pre and an 10m pre. What makes this more difficult is that founders will not reveal terms for obvious reasons. They can't say, "we're going to be raising at a 6m-9m pre" because that immediately shows that they would be willing to go to 6m. They may as well not mention 9m. So instead, they say something like, "we'll know terms once we get a lead." Okay, fine.. then we'll wait for the lead. =)
"Sometimes an investor will ask you to send them your deck and/or executive summary before they decide whether to meet with you. I wouldn't do that. It's a sign they're not really interested."
I'm surprised by this advice. As an investor, it saves everyone a ton of time when I can look at a deck before a meeting. I will sit down for 15-45 minutes before a meeting, go through deck, do some internet research, and think of questions I want to ask. This saves time because I can find out answers to the basic questions that I would ask in the deck, and then we can focus on more interesting questions and concerns during the meeting.
"Sometimes an investor will ask you to send them your deck and/or executive summary before they decide whether to meet with you. I wouldn't do that. It's a sign they're not really interested."
I can look at a deck before a meeting. I will sit down for 15-45 minutes before a meeting, ... more interesting questions and concerns during the meeting.
It sounds like you want a deck before a meeting, which isn't contradicted by PG. PG says don't give a deck before not having a meeting. In more straightforward logic don't give decks to window shoppers. If they can't spare time to meet with you then they aren't interested, don't bother giving them a deck. Nothing in that quote suggests withholding a deck after they decide to meet with you but before the meeting.
"And now that I've written this, everyone else can blame me if they want. That plus the inexperience card should work in most situations: sorry, we think you're great, but PG said startups shouldn't ___, and since we're new to fundraising, we feel like we have to play it safe."
>> These lines will echo in the glass conference rooms of the valley for years to come...
A question on a side digression: "falls within our thesis" - I often hear/read the term "thesis" being used by investors, and I am curious what exactly is meant by it. Is a thesis a tome of 100+ pages? Is a thesis two sentences, something like "we think that local/mobile/social will be hot this year"?
"Sometimes an investor will ask you to send them your deck and/or executive summary before they decide whether to meet with you. I wouldn't do that. It's a sign they're not really interested."
I am both surprised and relieved by this advice. I see some investors over optimize on deck creation and presentation skills. Personally, I have not seen any correlation between how fancy the deck is and subsequent success
Seems to me like the bottom two are not really disagreements. For the second to last, if they gave you terms, you'd invest, right?
For the last, you presumably aren't deciding whether to meet with them based on the deck; it's just nice to be able to review it so your mind is prepared.
[+] [-] pg|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] austenallred|12 years ago|reply
The hardest part of fundraising was getting the startup to a point where I actually believed in it. When I looked at our projections and where the company could go, I was no longer thinking, "Yeah, if a miracle happens," but rather, "It'll be hard, but I really, really think we can do that. We just need some help to get there."
Fundraising was a relative cakewalk when I was no longer selling investors on our company; I was explaining to investors that we were taking off, and asking them if they'd like to jump on board.
[+] [-] unclebucknasty|12 years ago|reply
For instance, when courting a large potential client or partner, your confidence goes up and you are not selling, so much as explaining. People pick up on this, and your results will show it. Plus, it just plain feels better when you really believe in your company's potential vs. merely hoping.
[+] [-] kori|12 years ago|reply
s/investors/women/ && s/investor/woman/
(works the other way too)
When you talk to women your m.o. should be breadth-first search, weighted by expected value. You should always talk to women in parallel rather than serially. You can't afford the time it takes to talk to women serially, plus if you only talk to one woman at a time, they don't have the pressure of other women to make them act. But you shouldn't pay the same attention to every woman, because some are more promising prospects than others. The optimal solution is to talk to all potential women in parallel, but give higher priority to the more promising ones.
[+] [-] tlb|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] drpancake|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] mhartl|12 years ago|reply
"There are many analogies between fundraising and dating, and this is one of the strongest. No one wants you if you seem desperate. And the best way not to seem desperate is not to be desperate. That's one reason we urge startups during YC to keep expenses low and to try to make it to ramen profitability before Demo Day. Though it sounds slightly paradoxical, if you want to raise money, the best thing you can do is get yourself to the point where you don't need to."
[+] [-] larrys|12 years ago|reply
For example if you are a (male) salesman then:
s/women/customers
(Keeping in mind not to spend more time with an attractive female customer with the hopes of scoring some non-business payback).
Of course any relationship decision you make is not the same as choosing investors although there are similarities.
[+] [-] unknown|12 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] Tyrant505|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] tomasien|12 years ago|reply
If you can't find some confidence that you're in that group, find a way to delay fundraising: keep your job, do consulting, work on alternate revenue streams, whatever, because fundraising when you're no in the group the bulk of this article applies to - trying to fundraise is hell. Not just hell like "it's really, really hard and frustrating" but hell like you could actually lose yourself in it, like you could actually get destroyed by it.
[+] [-] namenotrequired|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] cdixon|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] saturdayplace|12 years ago|reply
The card it gives to inexperienced players. This whole thing feels like a way to even out the information asymmetry inherent in these transactions.
[+] [-] sfrjay|12 years ago|reply
I'm glad Paul Graham think that decks are on the way out, because they're a ludicrous (or at least inefficient) way of understanding what a startup does. If you have a product, show me that. If you have financials, show me those. Otherwise it becomes a competition to see which companies can dedicate their design resources to make the prettiest deck, and which investors can do the math on your '30% growth' number to figure out that you're growing from 3 to 4 users.
The advice about valuation is also great. I listened in on a conversation with very smart founders who are used to optimizing things, and they were super concerned about having a great pre-money valuation. It's tempting to focus on it because it's your only benchmark at a really stressful stage, but if things go badly it won't matter, and if things go really well it... won't matter either.
[+] [-] tlb|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] unknown|12 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] wpietri|12 years ago|reply
In his case, I think having a couple of slides to help demonstrate the problem is very helpful. Otherwise there isn't a sufficient aha moment when he gets to the solution.
[+] [-] Felix21|12 years ago|reply
For the first time we have an investable business (revenue, growth, profits, big market, happy customers).
Just as we were thinking: how do we go about this? Do we even have the time?
Then such an informative article comes along.
Thanks a lot PG.
[+] [-] bryanh|12 years ago|reply
What a great line.
[+] [-] wpietri|12 years ago|reply
Not that what PG says here is exactly news to me at this point, but his wide experience and resulting confidence is fantastic confirmation of things that I now know to suspect, but at the time seemed so reasonable. Oh, you don't lead? Oh, you want to see just a little more progress? Well of course you do. And I, earnest nerd, took them at their word.
[+] [-] larrys|12 years ago|reply
"You can't trust your intuitions. I'm going to give you a set of rules here that will get you through this process if anything will. At certain moments you'll be tempted to ignore them. So rule number zero is: these rules exist for a reason. You wouldn't need a rule to keep you going in one direction if there weren't powerful forces pushing you in another."
What this seems to be saying (to young people) is "it's ok to ignore what other older more experienced people say (or what established practices are) and try to disrupt in those situations because the guidelines and experience they have is bogus but I am telling you that my rules are right so just trust me".
[+] [-] jasonshen|12 years ago|reply
pg and YC has more qualified investing experience than probably any other "experienced person" you could talk to. When you are doing a startup, it's generally a good idea to focus on innovating in your core area of expertise - which would be some combination of product/market/technology - and take the best practices of all the other areas, like financing.
[+] [-] YuriNiyazov|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] j_baker|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ekanes|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] agrona|12 years ago|reply
e.g. in this context:
> The founder who handles fundraising should be the CEO, who should in turn be the most formidable of the founders.
[+] [-] sillysaurus2|12 years ago|reply
"But the foundation of convincing investors is to seem formidable, and since this isn't a word most people use in conversation much, I should explain what it means. A formidable person is one who seems like they'll get what they want, regardless of whatever obstacles are in the way. Formidable is close to confident, except that someone could be confident and mistaken. Formidable is roughly justifiably confident."
[+] [-] jacquesm|12 years ago|reply
Slight disagree with the line:
"For example, if a reputable investor is willing to invest on a convertible note, using standard paperwork, that is either uncapped or capped at a good valuation, you can take that without having to think."
A good valuation means you're going to have to think anyway and if you don't need it you don't need it so then you're just going to have an obligation + temptation to use the funds. There is no such thing as 'free money' and a convertible note is simply deferring a part of the process and you'll need to take care of it sooner or later by going for funding (or paying back the loan). So if you are not sure if you are going to do a follow up round just yet I'd advise against getting a convertible loan, you now have a good chunk of the hassle of having an investor without having properly gone through the process required. Of course you could simply bank the money and pay back the loan if you are still of the same opinion later on but this rarely happens. It's the start-up equivalent of easy credit card debt, and if the valuation turns out to be low you could end up regretting taking the money (for instance, you could lose control like this). Better to negotiate it when you're strong or if you feel very secure about your future valuation.
Having seen a lot of this from the other side of the table quite a few of the passages strike me as extremely negative about investors, I'm sure Paul has a ton more experience than I do so this carries a lot of weight with me but I don't recognize the behaviours he sketches with the investors that I normally work for. Maybe they are the exception (I'm sure they'd like to think that :) ), but I can't imagine it is this black.
Investors look at the process of investing mostly as risk elimination, and as a second best as risk reduction by enumerating the risks. If an investors bails at the last moment (for instance after you've already agreed on terms) that would either reflect very bad on the investor, or more commonly on the party invested in. It's not as clear-cut imo as it is sketched here that all start-ups are angelic and innocent and investors are all sharks to a man and employing dirty tactics to get you to sign on the dotted line.
Again, it's clear on which side my bread is buttered but I simply wouldn't work for investors deploying such tactics, but have yet to see this sort of behaviour in any VC of some stature. Otoh I've seen plenty of trickery by companies about to be invested in (and lots of good companies too).
[+] [-] mehuldesai|12 years ago|reply
Overall, negotiation and funding could almost be expressed as a rule table. Certain heuristics and rules. Rather than flip flopping strategies on how to negotiate and deal with investors, I think it may be good to have a set of rules/heuristics to follow and see if it leads to your goal. If it fails, alter it and see the result. Anyhow, thats what I intend to do for my company, GridCrowd.
For negotiation PG mentions that its may be ok to just admit your a noob or not knowledgeable on certain aspects of funding. I respectfully wonder if there is another stratedgy from what I've learnt in negotiations in the non-funding world?:
Negotiate from a perceived position of strength.
You don't have to say your a noob, miss the detail and expose it if it becomes necessary. This way you may be able to attain more action on behalf of the investor moving through their process. The noob strategy allows them to indicate a process that could be tailored to their advantage. I don't know investors, so its hard for me to understand their objectives and how they behave. I'll re-read PGs advise again, he does have great credibility and wiseness so maybe I need more study on this strategy.
[+] [-] mattmaroon|12 years ago|reply
Reminds me of a great quote from a family member. When my cousin's son started playing football, my cousin told him "the first time you get into the endzone, act like you've been there before".
[+] [-] zaguios|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] sillysaurus2|12 years ago|reply
In that case, it's probably good to think of ways to move to the valley.
It sounds like the only investors in your area are probably individuals who happen to be wealthy, i.e. potential angel investors. But outside of the valley, angels tend to be family or people you're already acquainted with. And even if you can get them to invest in you, they're going to be less experienced than valley angels, meaning they may be dangerous to you. E.g. they'll probably rely heavily on their lawyer to structure the deal, and since you're not in the valley, that lawyer probably isn't a startup specialist, so you'll need to be extra careful they're structuring the deal properly (and structuring your company properly, if they're incorporating you).
Investment can be had in places other than the valley, of course. But the reason you want to be in the valley is because (a) that's where the top investors are, and (b) there are a lot of them. Raising investment anywhere else therefore increases the risk of having bad terms forced on you by clueless angels or predatory VCs.
Choosing to seek investment in the valley is like choosing the high ground in a battle: it's naturally suited to protect you from dying. And since avoiding death is every startup's most important goal, the valley is therefore the most important place to be.
http://paulgraham.com/hubs.html
http://paulgraham.com/startuphubs.html
http://paulgraham.com/siliconvalley.html
http://paulgraham.com/cities.html
[+] [-] pg|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] wellboy|12 years ago|reply
Don't waste any idea on fundraising until you have product fit, market fit and first initial traction. Trying to fund raise before that is the sign of an amateur and if you actually get an investor interested before product fit, you will get a very shitty deal and the whole process will kill you.
Been there done that.
[+] [-] wellboy|12 years ago|reply
It's very hard as a first time founder to mimic the arrogance that is natural for experienced founders. If you can do it, it's great, if you can't, it will burn your bridges and blacklist you.^^
If you can pull it off though, you're the master. It's the pinnacle of hustling, having nothing to offer but being as confident as the next Mark Zuckerberg.
So you'd need to be as confident as Mark Zuckerberg when he had $1M users when you only have 1000 users. However, that also only works if you intrinsically think of yourself as a very high-value individual and if you have worked for several on you to think that way. Otherwise, investors will quickly spot your fake.
[+] [-] lpolovets|12 years ago|reply
- "Investors will try to lure you into fundraising when you're not. It's great for them if they can, because they can thereby get a shot at you before everyone else."
- "What investors would like to do, if they could, is wait. When a startup is only a few months old, every week that passes gives you significantly more information about them."
- "Though you can focus on different plans when talking to different types of investors, you should on the whole err on the side of underestimating the amount you hope to raise."
- "You will be in a much stronger position if your collection of plans includes one for raising zero dollars—i.e. if you can make it to profitability without raising any additional money."
- "If you have multiple founders, pick one to handle fundraising so the other(s) can keep working on the company."
- "It's a mistake to behave arrogantly to investors." (I also think it's a mistake for investors to behave arrogantly to founders)
That said, I wanted to comment on a few of the other points in this (awesome) essay:
"To founders, the behavior of investors is often opaque—partly because their motivations are obscure, but partly because they deliberately mislead you."
That's a strong statement. First, not all investors mislead -- many are honest people. Second, startups are also often guilty of misdirection, which doesn't mean you shouldn't call out shitty investors, but I do think you should call out both sides instead of making one side sound like the bad guy.
"Do you have to be introduced? In phase 2, yes."
I think this is true 95% of the time, but it's not 100% true. My partners and I get pitch decks emailed to us by random people. Most of the time the pitch decks are subpar, but I think that's because not being able to get a real intro is a sign that your team/idea/traction/something else is subpar. However, this is just a signal, and there is no rule - written or unwritten - that says "if we don't know the sender then the deck goes in the trash." If you email us something that falls within our thesis and looks promising, we'd love to talk to you.
"Never leave a meeting with an investor without asking what happens next. What more do they need in order to decide?"
This is great advice. Most founders we talk to already ask "what's next" at the end of a meeting, but not all of them do.
"And while most investors are influenced by how interested other investors are in you, there are some who have an explicit policy of only investing after other investors have. You can recognize this contemptible subspecies of investor because they often talk about "leads.""
I guess I'm one of the members of that contemptible subspecies. My partners and I are in the middle of raising a fund, but we were investing with our own money for the better part of this year. Our checks were too small to lead, but there were lots of startups that didn't have terms. If you're raising 1m on a 5m pre, then we don't need a lead to invest. If you're raising 1m-2m on a ??? pre, then we would prefer to wait to find out what ??? is. We're not super valuation sensitive, so 7m vs 8m is fine, but there's a big difference between a 6m pre and an 10m pre. What makes this more difficult is that founders will not reveal terms for obvious reasons. They can't say, "we're going to be raising at a 6m-9m pre" because that immediately shows that they would be willing to go to 6m. They may as well not mention 9m. So instead, they say something like, "we'll know terms once we get a lead." Okay, fine.. then we'll wait for the lead. =)
"Sometimes an investor will ask you to send them your deck and/or executive summary before they decide whether to meet with you. I wouldn't do that. It's a sign they're not really interested."
I'm surprised by this advice. As an investor, it saves everyone a ton of time when I can look at a deck before a meeting. I will sit down for 15-45 minutes before a meeting, go through deck, do some internet research, and think of questions I want to ask. This saves time because I can find out answers to the basic questions that I would ask in the deck, and then we can focus on more interesting questions and concerns during the meeting.
[+] [-] stonemetal|12 years ago|reply
It sounds like you want a deck before a meeting, which isn't contradicted by PG. PG says don't give a deck before not having a meeting. In more straightforward logic don't give decks to window shoppers. If they can't spare time to meet with you then they aren't interested, don't bother giving them a deck. Nothing in that quote suggests withholding a deck after they decide to meet with you but before the meeting.
[+] [-] 3327|12 years ago|reply
>> These lines will echo in the glass conference rooms of the valley for years to come...
[+] [-] YuriNiyazov|12 years ago|reply
[+] [-] vasilipupkin|12 years ago|reply
I am both surprised and relieved by this advice. I see some investors over optimize on deck creation and presentation skills. Personally, I have not seen any correlation between how fancy the deck is and subsequent success
[+] [-] ecuzzillo|12 years ago|reply
For the last, you presumably aren't deciding whether to meet with them based on the deck; it's just nice to be able to review it so your mind is prepared.
[+] [-] adamzerner|12 years ago|reply