aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Peter Thiel: The Online Privacy Debate Won’t End With Gawker
aaronmhatch's comments
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
The poster cannot request a certain value. All dreams start at 1.
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
After you join, you may view dreams that have a value of zero for free. You also start with one DreamCoin, so you can submit one dream for free essentially. If people like it, you'll accumulate coins that can be used to view other entries. DreamCoins are also given to users as a gift at random times, so that's another way to do it.
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
Is the interface confusing to you? If so, what would make it more intuitive?
I'm willing to pay anyone (in DreamCoins) who helps to develop an effective explanation. You can cash out DreamCoins, so there's real value if you want to help me out.
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
aaronmhatch | 9 years ago | on: Show HN: DreamCoin: Anonymously Share Your Ideas and Profit
It's still a work in progress with an experimental design, so if you have any suggestions, I'll send you some DreamCoins for helping me out. If you're interested in joining the team, please let me know. Can't offer any full time positions at the moment.
I've received some feedback from people saying they had a hard time figuring out how to create an idea. It seems straightforward to me, but then again, I'm the one who designed it.
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
That an unintended person can read your private messages is an unfortunate consequence of compromise. What we'd have to do is figure out a way to implement a security system that detects all intruders via cyber-forensics or whatever other effective means.
I see the consequences of unrestricted encryption as more severe than the consequences of restricted encryption.
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
1. Apple could develop new software and give the FBI the key. That is the true back door.
2. Apple could disable the guess limit and let the government brute-force the code. This is the "lesser" back door.
In most encryption cases around the world, the government can get in with enough computing power. They can brute-force as they see fit, which is a problem for all people who support encryption. These people essentially are in favor of a method of privacy protection that works only as well as the math used to support it. In this case, the math is only so dependable.
The other option is to depend on due process, checks and balances, and the branches of power. Government cracking encryption is inevitable, so sticking to absolute encryption and refusing compromise is a losing battle in the long run. We might as well start today on working out a compromise, developing and implementing a federal system that appropriately handles the privacy of our communications.
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
"any restrictions on encryption must be contained in laws that are precise and transparent"
^ This suggests that they think restrictions are possible, whereas many pro-encryption people think that restrictions are mathematically impossible and are stupid to even suggest.
"must be used only when necessary to achieve a legitimate aim"
^ Again, while there is no specific recommendation, they are implicitly suggesting that restrictions are acceptable under certain conditions.
"any measure interfering with encryption must be proportionate to achieving the legitimate aim for which it is imposed, and the benefits gained through the adoption of such measure must not be outweighed by the harm caused, including to individuals and network infrastructure and security."
^ Same thing. In three separate places, they suggest that restrictions are permissible, and they are making recommendations for when they may be permissible.
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
Restrictions are discussed in section 4, page 25.
Their recommendations are in part 5, page 31:
"any restrictions on encryption must be contained in laws that are precise and transparent, must be used only when necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and must not discriminate against specific individuals or groups. Critically, any measure interfering with encryption must be proportionate to achieving the legitimate aim for which it is imposed, and the benefits gained through the adoption of such measure must not be outweighed by the harm caused, including to individuals and network infrastructure and security."
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
How do we solve this? It's hard to say, but there are solutions. foolshdropout's first Guardian link presents a good example with the TSA luggage lock standardization. That is essentially a backdoor and has led to many thefts. The flaw in that example, however, is that with enough force, a lock can be broken, and any luggage can be penetrated, making the need for master keys and standardized locks unnecessary. So, it's not a good analogy with encryption, which cannot realistically be broken into.
Giving the government master keys to standardized encryption methods is not a good way to do it. However, the FBI's method of getting Apple to disable the guess limit is a "lesser" backdoor, if you must call it that. That provides some compromise because it requires the government going to Apple for each warrant and having them on a case-by-case basis disable the limit. This adds a few hurdles to slow down the process, which is basically what encryption does in the first place, while allowing authorities to lawfully search and seize.
I'm not sure what the answer is, but I know that if we stick to absolutes (total encryption, no encryption), we are only hurting ourselves.
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
My experience living in the United States and researching other countries has given me that perspective.
> Yes, I am against the assumption that backdoors are a good idea, whoever puts it forward, and whatever you try to call them.
So, you do disagree with Amnesty International's recommendations for restricted encryption. That's fine, but I hope you also disagree with the government being allowed to enter our homes with a warrant.
aaronmhatch | 10 years ago | on: Encryption Needs a Side Door
I called it a "side door" to make the point that we need a compromise between the front and back. The pro-encryption crowd doesn't want a back door, and the anti-encryption crowd doesn't want a front door. As Amnesty International recommends, we need some compromise.
Given that you think I'm clueless on many fundamental levels, I presume you disagree with Amnesty International.