jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
jwcrux's comments
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
While my experience with Gophish was one of the things that brought me to Duo, Insight is not based on Gophish at all. I had the privilege of working with the team of engineers who built Insight and they are amazingly talented. It's a really high-quality product from an incredible team.
You hit the nail on the head as to why someone may prefer Insight to Gophish. Gophish, while being easy to set up, still requires _some_ setup and hosting. With Insight, everything is managed for you. This has significant time savings and infrastructure savings.
The downside to this is flexibility, which is what Gophish offers. Insight offers a good few pre-built templates while Gophish lets you create your own. You control everything and have the ability to tailor phishing campaigns exactly how you want them. Gophish was also built from the ground-up to be driven by an API, and has other features that may useful in more red-team scenarios (such as credential capture).
The other benefit to Gophish that you mentioned is that, since you control the infrastructure, you control all of the data end-to-end.
So while they're in a similar space, they're pretty different products with different strengths and weaknesses. If you're just starting to look into running a phishing simulation, I'd lean towards giving Insight a shot since it's super quick and easy to get a campaign out the door. Once you need more flexibility and power, Gophish is an easy transition. :)
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
I’ll take that as an opportunity for improvement. Thanks so much for taking the time to type out that feedback!
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
Just out of curiosity, does the copy on the main website [0] give a better indication or does that still not make for a clear description?
I ask because, while the repo was linked in this case, the main website is where most people land.
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
Recently, I did some analysis on phishing kits at a pretty large scale that sounds like it’d be of interest to you [0]
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
I view Gophish as a way to volunteer and give back to the larger security community. I love engaging with the Gophish community and seeing people use the software to measure their own exposure to phishing.
That said, there aren't any plans to monetize Gophish. It will always stay free and open-source so that anyone can use it. :)
As far as support, I try and respond to every issue as fast as possible. It's a best effort, but I managed to pass 1k closed issues recently, which I was pretty proud of! And I'm fortunate that there are so many amazing people in the Gophish community who are willing to jump into issues, help out, and bounce great ideas around.
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Gophish: An open source phishing toolkit
What a happy surprise to see my project on HN :)
My name is Jordan, I've been developing Gophish [0] for a few years now. The goal of the project is to let companies of all sizes perform high-quality phishing simulation regardless of their security budget.
Happy to answer any and all questions!
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: The Bell System Technical Journal
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Request TV shows or movies
jwcrux | 7 years ago | on: Learning ‘Montezuma’s Revenge’ from a single demonstration
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: 1.4B Clear Text Credentials Discovered in a Single Database
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Ethereal Email – A fake SMTP service
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Security Keys
The hard part is that there's another more subtle chicken and egg problem when it comes to software implementations and consumer HSM. Google/Apple/Microsoft will likely only really push forward native implementations when there is enough market share for consumer hardware having HSM's built in to make it worth it with feasible fallback options.
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Security Keys
Right now, not too many providers support these auth protocols, even though they are more secure than current 2fa alternatives and provide a better user experience. The aren't widely supported because that costs development time and many of their customers don't have security keys.
Customers won't buy security keys because it's an added cost that isn't supported by many websites.
The author of the post briefly mentions SoftU2F at the bottom of the post, but it's important to recognize how significant SoftU2F is to the U2F ecosystem.
We're just now starting to see consumer hardware come with HSM's built in. Apple SEP, Intel SGX, etc. are examples of this. SoftU2F _will_ be able to leverage these consumer HSM's to do secure crypto operations - see the pull request at [0] about storing keys in the SEP. This will effectively put U2F and UAF capability into the hands of your average consumer with no additional cost. Things can be just _built-in_, which is what it'll take to start seeing increased protocol adoption across browsers and service providers.
I'm stoked about the future of security keys and the associated protocols. Both external keys and HSM's built directly into consumer hardware.
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Harvesting Cb Response Data Leaks
That, to me, qualifies the term "VirusTotal and their partners" as accurate, since this is only a select group of companies who are paying VT a large sum for access to the data.
[0] https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/private-api/#fil...
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Harvesting Cb Response Data Leaks
The screenshot in Carbon Black's response clearly says that VirusTotal "makes the binaries available for download to their partners".
And here's the relevant text in the disclaimer:
> You are hereby advised (i) VirusTotal makes the metadata publicly available along with scan results from dozens of anti-virus products and (ii) VirusTotal also makes the files available to VirusTotal partners. You must determine whether to elect to enable this feature at your sole discretion.
And the warning also has this text in bold:
> If you have custom business applications with confidential business information on your network, sharing binaries with VirusTotal may not be appropriate for you.
With this being optional and off by default, I think it's on the customer to read the clear warning presented and make the call that's right for them.
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Pastes on Have I Been Pwned are no longer publicly listed
This is an interesting decision and I applaud Troy for, as always, doing what's best for his users. He's a great example of the kind of person we need more of in the industry.
Unfortunately, I run into the same problem. I have no doubt people can (and probably do) use dumpmon for nefarious purposes. My take on the matter when I first made dumpmon was that this data was clearly already known to the bad guys. The goal of the Twitter bot was to give a sense of how prevalent these "mini-breaches" were, but also to give the good guys (like HIBP!) a feed they can use to help stop the problem. I've been fortunate that multiple services have been able to use the feed to respond to these types of credential dumps really quickly.
If anyone is interested in some of the stats behind dumpmon, here's a shameless plug to an article I wrote a couple of years ago on the matter: https://jordan-wright.com/blog/2015/05/26/two-years-of-at-du...
Happy to answer any questions!
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Minebase: a free data mining tool for social networks
Just a heads up, IANAL, but make sure that you're considering Twitter (and other social network) API terms of service:
> If you provide Content to third parties, including downloadable datasets of Content or an API that returns Content, you will only distribute or allow download of Tweet IDs, Direct Message IDs, and/or User IDs.
> You may, however, provide export via non-automated means (e.g., download of spreadsheets or PDF files, or use of a “save as” button) of up to 50,000 public Tweet Objects and/or User Objects per user of your Service, per day.
> Any Content provided to third parties remains subject to this Policy, and those third parties must agree to the Twitter Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, Developer Agreement, and Developer Policy before receiving such downloads.
> You may not distribute more than 1,500,000 Tweet IDs to any entity (inclusive of multiple individual users associated with a single entity) within any given 30 day period, without the express written permission of Twitter.
[0] https://dev.twitter.com/overview/terms/agreement-and-policy
jwcrux | 8 years ago | on: Firefox 56 supports headless mode on Windows
I would imagine the same approach could be used here with minimal changes.
Their response was lightheartedly asking me if I really just sent them an email about a phishing simulation toolkit and expected them to click the links in the email :D