maxfan8 | 2 years ago | on: How to get transactions between almost any data stores
maxfan8's comments
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Volkswagen develops hydrogen car that can travel 2k kilometers on one tank
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Show HN: Pi-hole deployed at the edge on Fly.io and accessed via TailScale
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Show HN: Pi-hole deployed at the edge on Fly.io and accessed via TailScale
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: The madness of reduced medical diagnostics
I'll note that I never "pretended that it's not justifiable". I did explicitly say earlier:
> That's a fair position (you seem to be a utilitarian), and probably quite defensible.
I'm disengaging, for now, since it seems like we understand each other's position, and we had a productive, lively discussion.
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: The madness of reduced medical diagnostics
Does the position seem clear now? I apologize if this line of reasoning was not clear earlier.
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: The madness of reduced medical diagnostics
That's a fair position (you seem to be a utilitarian), and probably quite defensible. But, one could argue that patient choice is an important feature for our medical systems to have. I certainly want to be able to refuse medications that my doctor recommends (e.g. opioids) or seek alternate advice/second opinions. My cost-benefit analysis equation is probably not the same as my doctor.
To be clear, I'm not talking about an "idealized dream world", as you put it -- I'm talking about patient autonomy in the real world, even if it means allowing patients to make what seems like a suboptimal decision.
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: The madness of reduced medical diagnostics
Yes, my argument does rely on patients being rational agents.
> They aren't.
That may be true, but it's certainly paternalistic (in the formal, definitional sense) to act as if they are not rational agents and withhold information/reduce autonomy. This is a case of pure paternalism (again, in the formal philosophical sense).
Different ethical systems, of course, make different judgements on whether this behavior is moral. It's also up for debate whether this is a desirable feature of the medical system.
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: The madness of reduced medical diagnostics
In my opinion, the only justifiable factors are probably along the lines of:
- invasiveness (e.g. if it's non-invasive or minimal cost)
- benefit to the patient if detected
- cost relative to other screenings/actions that can be done for the patient
Everything else seems strictly suboptimal.
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: The madness of reduced medical diagnostics
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Google's Subsea Fiber Optics
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Solar-powered desalination device wins MIT $100K competition
Perhaps one way of encouraging a "greener" grid is to first encourage the development of cheap energy storage solutions, and then letting the market figure out the best way to utilize such storage (rather than the other way around). Might lead to more efficient/creative green energy solutions.
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Solar-powered desalination device wins MIT $100K competition
I think it’s very promising/exciting as a method of smoothing out the demand curves of the electric grid. Plus, it’s fairly straightforward to modify existing dams/hydro infrastructure to have this capacity.
Since some dams are already used as water reservoirs for drinking/agriculture, this could be quite viable if the desalination can be done cheaply and efficiently at scale (not sure if this is even possible on the scales required for this idea to make sense, though).
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Sccache – Shared Compilation Cache
maxfan8 | 3 years ago | on: Wittgenstein's visit to Ithaca in 1949 (2012) [pdf]
Here’s a particularly nice one about David Foster Wallace:
> James Wallace, who was a graduate student in philosophy in 1959-1962, not only learned philosophy at Cornell but also picked up a gesture of Wittgenstein. The gesture - hitting himself in the back of his head, to indicate what a fool he was was then passed on to his son, David Foster Wallace, who eventually figured out its origin.
maxfan8 | 4 years ago | on: The Kalman filter: helping chickens cross the road
Kalman filters rock!
[1]: https://www.bzarg.com/p/how-a-kalman-filter-works-in-picture... [2]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29473271).
maxfan8 | 4 years ago | on: Ask HN: Best hosted alternative to Google Workspace for email?
maxfan8 | 4 years ago | on: The brain as a universal learning machine (2015)
The argument is trying to say that the distinction from "actual reality" (whatever that means) and perception of reality doesn't make much sense. One cannot break free of their perceived reality in order to see/compare/reason about "actual reality".
> And if the counter-argument is that the perception of the outsiders is what causes those objects to exist ...
As I understand it, this is Berkeley's position.
> ... if we then killed all of those outside observers (say, just a few researchers who are aware of what is in the room surrounding the child's room), would the objects in that room then cease to exist (and if so, by what mechanism that we reasonably know exists)?
Yeah, basically -- assuming you, the experimenter/person who is observing this thought experiment, is also killed.
I think the issue with some of these thought experiments is that they assume there exists some omniscient perspective who can see every part of the experiment (i.e. the person running the experiment).
> To me, the obvious flaw here is that there seems to be an implicit "only" perceived within the conclusion: "Ordinary objects are [only] ideas [and nothing else]." This is an extremely common error that the human mind makes, but you'd think that a philosopher would catch it in review of an idea (or the reviewers, who say: "The argument is valid, and premise (1) looks hard to deny."), so I feel like I must be missing something in the argument.
Yeah, I think the link I sent doesn't sum up Berkeley's point well. Perhaps it'd be better to take a look at the original argument. [1]
> > Does it really make sense when materialists argue that unobservable, undetectable, totally unperceivable and uninferrable things in this world actually exist?
> It makes complete sense to me (and I typically disagree with materialists)!
Interesting! How do you reconcile this with the belief that "reality is contingent on our minds"?
[1]: This was the best-formatted online link I could find: https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/... (part 1, sections 3-5 are most relevant)
maxfan8 | 4 years ago | on: The brain as a universal learning machine (2015)
The way I like to think of Berkeley's position is like an equivalence argument. Suppose one is arguing that mind-independent objects exist (that is, there are things out there that cannot be perceived, but one claims to exist). Berkeley's conception of the world (in which such undetectable objects do not exist) is equivalent, at least from the perspective of any observer. Any mind/observer in the world, by construction, cannot perceive or detect (even indirectly) mind-independent objects. If they could, then those objects wouldn't be mind-independent. So a world in which mind-independent objects exist is indistinguishable from Berkeley's world.
Does it really make sense when materialists argue that unobservable, undetectable, totally unperceivable and uninferrable things in this world actually exist?
So, Berkeley argues that reality is actually contingent on our minds (and he tries to show that this isn't as big of a deal as it sounds).
Berkeley's real argument goes a bit differently (as I understand it), but I think a claim of functional equivalence may be more convincing for people with a math/CS background.
maxfan8 | 4 years ago | on: The brain as a universal learning machine (2015)
I interpreted the original comment to mean that the mind is necessary for reality (i.e. there is no meaningful reality outside the mind), which is very close to what Berkeley is gesturing at.
Either way, the questions you’re asking (which all themselves presuppose a certain metaphysical interpretation of the world) have interesting implications (it seems like what you’re driving at is similar to the mind-body problem).
Hope you found this interesting!