notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Apple Confirms Zero-Day Attacks Hitting macOS Systems
notactuallyben's comments
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations
All of this stuff is very complicated ethically, but I don't think you can simply say that it is always in the public good to expose bugs (stuxnet is a good example of a bug chain avoiding a far deadlier outcome)..
I've personally worked for vendors of software and done offensive research, and now I do neither.
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations
What about if the targets are like Osama Bin Laden's (* INSERT MORE MODERN TERRORIST) family (I have no idea who they are targeting).
Are you meant to have some dude speak arabic and become close friends with the top terorist leaders? Like how do you propose that even work? Would HUMINT actually work in those cases?
I think it's a nice idea for everyone to work on fixing the vulnerabilities, I don't think that will scale with whatever organisations mandate to stop terrorism or whatever.
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations
notactuallyben | 1 year ago | on: Hacking millions of modems and investigating who hacked my modem
notactuallyben | 2 years ago | on: NSO group iPhone zero-click, zero-day exploit captured in the wild
notactuallyben | 3 years ago | on: Google: Turn off VoLTE, Wi-Fi calling: severe Exynos modem vulnerabilities
Load that into Hexagoon IDA plugin and you'll see it's bog standard Hexagon for all the remote GSM/LT code that actually does stuff (similar to the project zero research). I haven't verified (and don't own a Pinephone) but most Quectel boards I've seen in the past do enforce signature validation, so binary patches are not easy.
notactuallyben | 3 years ago | on: Google: Turn off VoLTE, Wi-Fi calling: severe Exynos modem vulnerabilities
notactuallyben | 3 years ago | on: Google: Turn off VoLTE, Wi-Fi calling: severe Exynos modem vulnerabilities
notactuallyben | 3 years ago | on: Google: Turn off VoLTE, Wi-Fi calling: severe Exynos modem vulnerabilities
But yep, would be nice if it was open source, although not sure how much that would help (only if sufficiently motivated auditors can be bothered to look at it). A bunch of baseband firmware is even encrypted on disk now (loaded into BB memory from the kernel)
notactuallyben | 3 years ago | on: Google: Turn off VoLTE, Wi-Fi calling: severe Exynos modem vulnerabilities
notactuallyben | 3 years ago | on: Google: Turn off VoLTE, Wi-Fi calling: severe Exynos modem vulnerabilities
but this statement about baseband mitigations is only partially true. Huawei Balong platform has ASLR and stack canaries now (and some Infineon too I believe), and all baseband platforms are improving (even Mediatek). I didn't check Qualcomm lately, but they have a lot of similar protections now.
It's not trivial to do a pivot to AP on modern iPhones or Android phones (excluding some categories) - especially with PAC (and MTE coming).
But yeah, (Samsung) Shannon are an attractive target for attackers due to easily obtainable firmware, strings, DWARF (elf) firmware that you can find and relatively good debugging platform. The bugs are generally pretty low hanging too.
This isn't the same on Qualcomm platforms (Hexagon is notoriously hard to RE and debug), or the iPhone platforms.