ssono | 5 years ago | on: Two Heads: A marriage devoted to the mind-body problem (2007)
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ssono | 8 years ago | on: Show HN: uMOOC, an online tutoring platform for Harvard's CS50 and MIT's 6.00.1
While the pricing model would be different, it might allow for a more personalized learning experience and a relationship between tutor and tutee. Either way, I love that you are making self motivated learning more accessible.
ssono | 8 years ago | on: Ask HN: Do you have a business idea? Why haven't you tried it?
ssono | 9 years ago | on: Ask HN: What subjects should be removed/replaced in school? With what?
Curriculum organization is one of his main points. An alternative to periods and subjects is a sort of freeform classroom with unpaced curriculum with several teachers circulating to help. This is supposed to avoid classes moving too quickly or too slowly and continually engage students.
ssono | 9 years ago | on: Where Do the Failed 0.1% Go? (2015) [pdf]
.The person you are when interacting is nothing but a character. You have to fake engagement, interest, and ability in order to have friends or you can be alone.
.You need to give your life some long term goal otherwise no work has meaning because it serves no use. However, say your goal is to cure cancer you know you have to do well in school and social to later gain access to the resources necessary for your goal. An RPG without a quest is no fun.
The way the Churchlands' approach the mind is through reductive materialism. Basically they argue that the mind is identical to the brain given that brain process A causes mental/internal process B. With that reduction we should either eliminate language for mental experience or root it entirely in the corresponding physical process.
This sort of reduction is more or less a scientific reduction in that it serves an explanatory purpose. However, some philosophers reject the idea that scientific reduction is sufficient for a philosophical reduction which is something along the lines of brain process A completely explaining mental experience B. The problem that a philosophical reduction poses is that of internal experience.
Non-reductionists would argue that no amount of physical data could explain subjective experience. Brain scans can show what happens physiologically when you are happy, but not the 'what it's like to be happy'. Whether or not that's convincing to you is a matter of personal preference.
The bottom line seems to be that there is a major physical aspect to the mind, but also that we feel like we are more than chemical reactions. It is not clear that we can practically get rid of either dualism or materialism.
If you are curious, look at Thomas Nagel, and 'the hard problem of consciousness' by Chalmers.