thefurman | 5 years ago | on: The unsettling truth about the ‘Mostly Harmless’ hiker
thefurman's comments
thefurman | 5 years ago | on: Anu: A sound, distributed version control systema
I believe that you need to understand the semantics of the code to truly do what you are trying to do well, and for all other cases the snapshot model is more than good enough and given how we structure and modify code, it works out really well in practice. Code dealing with a single aspect should and almost always is co-located, so to get a conflict of intention in a merge is very rare. There are other human aspects like code ownership and collaborating teams which makes the issue even less of a problem.
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: Help the Graphics team track down an interesting WebRender bug
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: Help the Graphics team track down an interesting WebRender bug
If you want to reproduce it yourselves then perhaps try pointing a hairdryer from a distance at the various components until they start to create trouble, or alternatively just overclock them towards the breaking points.
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: Rock climbing and the economics of innovation
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: No Maintenance Intended
Will it stay open source and free to use? Will it be actively maintained? Can I get support for issues in a timely manner? Will someone be there to helpfully guide or at least review and accept my contributions?
There needs many more dimensions to the categorization and it would be very nice if OSS projects could be graded along them all.
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: Samsung: Anyone's thumbprint can unlock Galaxy S10 phone
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: Samsung: Anyone's thumbprint can unlock Galaxy S10 phone
And can be compromised without theft, coercion or any other trace.
> One can be swapped out if compromised or get lost.
Which makes something you are strictly worse than something you have.
> undergoes slow changes over time
You are lacking an argument for anything attached to this point.
> ...it makes sense to split it into two categories
So you are arguing that because something is strictly worse from a security standpoint, it should be categorised as a new category? Have I summed up your position correctly?
There are usability benefits which would exist similarly by attaching something which couldn't be easily compromised to your body. For example a chip under your skin or just carrying a watch on your wrist which you could authenticate with after putting it on and which would un-authenticate automatically when it is taken off. Nobody would argue that you are your chip or your watch.
Something you know is different because there are no plausible ways aside coercion and similar for extracting such secrets in idle, and the other alternative is to get compromised on usage. It's about the threat models.
thefurman | 6 years ago | on: Samsung: Anyone's thumbprint can unlock Galaxy S10 phone
thefurman | 7 years ago | on: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report
If they've been working tirelessly, then they should have understood the risks and grounded the fleet.
Either they understood the risks, but neglected to ground the fleet, or they didn't understand the risks and hence we can't trust the fix.
I also find it sort of nauseating that the CEO implicitly gets the message through that the fix already has been worked on for a long time, has thus matured, can now be fully trusted, and we are just weeks away from flying with a safe plane.
I don't buy any of it. Let's analyse this critically.
The MCAS still needs to augment the flight characteristics. There is nothing that can be fundamentally changed regarding this fact. We can only change the conditions under which MCAS activates and the conditions under which it is deactivated.
It still has to have the same authority for a nose-down and recovering from an erroneous high-magnitude nose-down will still be mechanically hard or require additional pilot knowledge and actions. The latter should be impossible without recertification.
The operational characteristics of the airplane are not matched with the operational controls offered to the pilots, by design constraint. The plane is thus unsafe and will forever be unsafe, without redesign and recertification, because with the constraints in place, they can only add additional information on displays, add more reliability by having the MCAS utilise input from more sensors, add more conditions under which the the MCAS deactivates, etc, but none of this attacks the fundamental impedance mismatch between characteristics and controls, as well as the lack of education for it. Deactivation also simply exchanges the risk of stalls for nose downs.
All-in-all, the MAX is simply an airplane with a worse flight envelope as far as safety is concerned, and nothing can be done about it.
thefurman | 7 years ago | on: MacOS System 6, Version 6.0.8: run in browser
thefurman | 7 years ago | on: Sucking carbon dioxide from air is cheaper than scientists thought
thefurman | 7 years ago | on: Sucking carbon dioxide from air is cheaper than scientists thought
thefurman | 7 years ago | on: Sucking carbon dioxide from air is cheaper than scientists thought
thefurman | 8 years ago | on: Apple Sued an iPhone Repair Shop Owner in Norway and Lost